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Fundarnentals of educational planning—51

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The relation of educational plans to economic and social planning

R. Poignant

Planning and the educational administrator C.E. Beeby

The social context of educational planning C.A. Anderson

The costing of educational plans, J. Vaizey, J. D. Chesswas

The problems of rural education, V.L. Criffiths

Educational planning; the adviser's role, A. Curle

Demographic aspects of educational planning, Ta Ngoc C

The analysis of educational costs and expenditure, J. Hallak

The professional identity of the educational planner, A. Curle

The conditions for success in educational planning, G.C. Ruscoe

Cost-benefit analysis in educational planning, M. Woodhall

Planning educational assistance for the second development decade,

H.M. Philips

Realistic educational planning, K.R. McKinnon

Planning education in relation to rural development, C.M. Coverdale

Alternatives and decisions in educational planning, J.D. Montgomery

Planning the school curriculum, A. Lewy

Cost factors in planning educational technological systems, D.T.Jamison

The planner and lifelong education, P. Furter

Education and employment: a critical appraisal, M. Carnoy

Planning teacher demand and supply, P.Williams

Planning early childhood care and education in developing countries

A. Heron

Communication media in education for low-income countries

E.G. McAnany, J.K Mayo

The planning of nonformal education, D.R. Evans

Education, training and the traditional sector, J. Hallak, F. Caillods

Higher education and employment: the IIEPexperience in five

less-developed countries G. Psacharopoulos, B.C. Sanyal

Educational planning as a social process, T. Malan

Higher education and social stratification: an international comparative

study,T. Husén

A conceptual framework for the development of lifelong education in

the USSR, A. Vladislavlev

Education in austerity: options for planners, K Lewin

Educational planning in Asia, R. Roy-Singh

Education projects: elaboration, financing and management, A. Magnen

Increasing teacher effectiveness, L.W. Anderson

National and school-based curriculum development, A. Lewy

Planning human resources: methods, experiences and pratices,

O. Bertrand

Redefining basic education for Latin America: lessons to be learned from the

Colombian Escuela Nueva, E. Schiefelbein

The management of distance learning systems,

G. Rumble

Educational strategies for small island states, D. Atchoarena

Judging educational research based on experiments and surveys, R.M. Wolf

Law and educational planning, I. Birch.

Utilizing education and human resource sector analyses, F. Kemmerer

Cost analysis of educational inclusion of marginalized populations

Mun C. Tsang.

An efficiency-based management information system, Walter W. McMahon.

National examinations: design, procedures and reporting, John P. Keeves.

Included in the series:*

* Also published in French. Other titles to appear.

Education policy-planning

process: an applied

framework

Wadi D. Haddad

with the assistance of Terri Demsky

Paris 1995

UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning

The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) has

provided financial assistance for the publication of this booklet.

This booklet is derived from a study (

 

The dynamics of educatio -

nal policy making: case studies of Peru, Jordan, Thailand and

Burkina Faso - 1 9 9 4

 

) by the same authors, prepared for and published

by the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this booklet,

though, are the responsibility of the authors and should not be

attributed to the World Bank or the International Institute for

Educational Planning.

Published in 1995 by the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

7 place de Fontenoy, 75700, Paris

Cover design by Bruno Pfäffli

ISBN 92-803- 1 1 55-7

© UNESCO 1995 IIEP/ko'f

5

Fundamentals of educational planning

The booklets in this series are written primarily for two types of clientele: those

engaged in educational planning and administration, in developing as well as

developed countries; and others, less specialized, such as senior government officials

and policy-makers who seek a more general understanding of educational

planning and of how it is related to overall national development. They are intended

to be of use either for private study or in formal training programmes.

Since this series was launched in 1967 practices and concepts of educational

planning have undergone substantial change. Many of the assumptions

which underlay earlier attempts to rationalize the process of educational development

have been criticized or abandoned. Even if rigid mandatory centralized

planning has now clearly proven to be inappropriate, this does not mean that all

forms of planning have been dispensed with. On the contrary, the need for collecting

data, evaluating the efficiency of existing programmes, undertaking a

wide range of studies, exploring the future and fostering broad debate on these

bases to guide educational policy and decision making has become even more

acute than before.

The scope of educational planning has been broadened. In addition to the

formal system of education, it is now applied to all other important educational

e fforts in nonformal settings. Attention to the growth and expansion of educational

systems is being complemented and sometimes even replaced by a growing

concern for the quality of the entire educational process and for the control

of its results. Finally, planners and administrators have become more and more

aware of the importance of implementation strategies and of the role of diff erent

regulatory mechanisms in this respect: the choice of financing methods, the

examination and certification procedures or various other regulation and incenttiivvee

stsrturucctuturreess.. ThTeh ec onccoenrcne ornf ploafn neprlsa ninse trws ofiosl d:t wtoo froeladc:h ato b etrteearch

understanding of the validity of education in its own empirically observed

specific dimensions and to help in defining appropriate strategies for

c h a n g e .

The purpose of these booklets includes monitoring the evolution and change

in educational policies and their effect upon educational planning requirements;

highlighting current issues of educational planning and analyzing them in the

context of their historical and societal setting; and disseminating methodologies

of planning which can be applied in the context of both the developed and the

developing countries.

In order to help the Institute identify the real up-to-date issues in educational

planning and policy making in different parts of the world, an Editorial Board has

been appointed, composed of two general editors and associate editors from different

regions, all professionals of high repute in their own field. At the first meeting

of this new Editorial Board in January 1990, its members identified key

topics to be covered in the coming issues under the following headings:

1. Education and development

2. Equity considerations

3. Quality of education

4. Structure, administration and management of education

5. Curriculum

6. Cost and financing of education

7. Planning techniques and approaches

8. Information systems, monitoring and evaluation

Each heading is covered by one or two associate editors.

The series has been carefully planned but no attempt has been made to avoid

differences or even contradictions in the views expressed by the authors. The

Institute itself does not wish to impose any official doctrine. Thus, while the

views are the responsibility of the authors and may not always be shared by

UNESCO or the IIEP, they warrant attention in the international forum of ideas.

Indeed, one of the purposes of this series is to reflect a diversity of experience and

opinions by giving different authors from a wide range of backgrounds and disciplines

the opportunity of expressing their views on changing theories and practices

in educational planning.

The present booklet is concerned with educational policy making.

Educational planning and educational policy making are closely interconnected.

Planners who do not understand how policies are forrnulated are not

ensured of success; neither can they be of great help to policy-m a k e r s .

Fundamentals of educational planning

6

Indeed, planning entails a variety of processes, from the analysis of the present

situation, the generation and assessment of policy options, to the careful preparation

and monitoring of policy implementation, eventually leading to the redefinition

of a new policy cycle. A variety of players intervene in these processes and

if their interests are not carefully assessed and taken care of, then the policy or

the plan will have every chance of failing. Educational history is full of reforms

and plans which were never implemented precisely because the interests of certain

key actors (parents or teachers) had not been taken into consideration, financial

and human resources implications had not been carefully assessed or the system's

managerial capacity had not systematically been taken into account.

The contents of the present booklet, which was written by Wadi Haddad with

the assistance of Terri Demsky, contain an integrated model of educational decision

making, illustrated by some four critically analyzed country case studies.

The authors draw some lessons for the attention of educational planners. No one

but Wadi Haddad, who was Chief Adviser to the President of Lebanon, the

Executive Secretary of the World Conference on Education for All, and who is

now Deputy Secretary of the World Bank, would have been in a better position to

present this important topic.

Indeed, Aid agencies are now amongst the most powerful players in the decision-

making process in many developing countries. As the case studies in this

booklet illustrate, they have not always exercised their respective influential position

in the best possible way. This booklet should definitely interest planners,

decision-makers but also those donors who want to see educational change taking

place with the good of the countries in mind.

I would like to thank Douglas M. Windham, Distinguished Service Professor

at the State University of New York at Albany, special editor of this issue, for the

very active role he played in its preparation.

Jacques Hallak

Assistant Director-General, UNESCO

Director, IIEP

Fundamentals of educational planning

7

Composition of the Editorial Board

Chairrnan:

General Editors:

Associate Editors:

8

Jacques Hallak

Assistant Director-General, UNESCO

Director, IEP

Françoise Caillods

IIEP

T. Neville Postlethwaite

University of Hamburg

Germany

Arfah A. Aziz

Ministry of Education

Malaysia

Jean-Claude Eicher

University of Bourgogne

France

Claudio de Moura Castro

Inter-American Development Bank

USA

Kenneth N. Ross

IIEP/

Deakin University

Australia

Richard Sack

International Consultant

France

Douglas M. Windham

State University of New York at Albany

USA

Preface

The last two decades have seen a shift in the balance of interest between

educational planning (with its emphasis on design, implementation,

and monitoring) and educational policy making (with an emphasis

on how educational policy alternatives are identified and final

choices made). Increasingly, educational planners realize that both the

constraints and opportunities they face are often traceable to the decisions

made by policy-makers, usually before the professional planning

staff has had a role in the discussion.

This shift in interest among planners has occurred simultaneously

with the shift of educational responsibility to regional/local government

agencies, to non government organizations, and to the private

sector in many countries. This means that the planners' greater attention

to policy-making issues is occurring at the very time that the

p o l i c y-making process is increasing dramatically in complexity and

d i ffusion. Obviously, educational policy making and educational

planning have always been linked. What has not been linked is the

utilization of the insights of the planners by the policy-makers. T h e

question planners face now is whether the new policy-making environment

will seriously constrain their attempts to ensure the early

discussion of planning considerations as part of the educational polic

y-making process.

The Haddad/Demsky volume,

 

The policy-planning process in

education: an applied framework

 

, is a superb introduction to the

p o l i c y-making process for both experienced and new planners (as

well as scholars, researchers, and other administrators who will

benefit from the volume's lucid presentation). As defined,

 

p o l i c y

9

represents decisions that are designed to guide (including to constrain)

future decisions, or to initiate and guide the implementation of previous

decisions. It is this time-bound nature of policy, and of policy

making, that makes it such a critical concern for the educational planner.

To a large extent, it is the planners' decisions that will be guided

or constrained and it is the planners who will have to follow the implementation

guidelines established by policy. For too long, planners have

played a passive role in the policy-making process and have taken as

given the set of delimitation’s imposed on them. There is an urgent

need for planners to play a larger role in policy making, not as arbiters

of policy decisions, but as partners in the policy-making process who

can alert the decision-makers, political or administrative, to the costs

and benefits (quantitative and qualitative) of alternative policy options.

The policy-making process, like educational development itself is

not a straightforward, easily understandable process. To help one better

comprehend the untidiness and overlapping nature of how educational

decisions are made, W.D. Haddad and T. Demsky present a framework

which clarifies without doing violence to the complex reality

of policy making. One of the requirements of their framework is the

need to relax the assumptions of rationality and adequacy of information

which underlie much of the Traditional literature on planning and

policy making. Rationality is still used in assessing the decisions

made, it simply is not an assumed determinant of the decisions.

A major contribution of the Haddad/Demsky volume is that once

the framework is posited, they proceed to examine its value in four real

world cases - Burkina Faso, Jordan, Peru, and Thailand. In each case,

the framework shows its value in explaining why certain policies were

developed and why they were implemented in the manner they were.

One point which should be emphasized here is the ability of the

Haddad/Demsky framework to deal with the dynamics of the policy-

planning cycle. It stresses the linkages between pre- and post-decision

activities and emphasizes the continuing nature of the process as

implementation by planners of one set of policy decisions establishes

the context for the next cycle of policy and planning activities.

Preface

10

A special comment should be made about the contribution of the

authors to a renewed optimism about what can be achieved in educational

development. The failure of the traditional planning models and

the recognition of the lack of rationality that can occur in policy

making have combined to create an atmosphere of pessimism among

some educationalists. W.D. Haddad and T. Demsky show that this current

pessimism is as unjustified as was the naive optimism that characterized

much of education in the 1960s and 1970s. W.D. Haddad

and T. Demsky leave us with an improved understanding of the difficulty

of our work as planners and policy analysts but with an enhanced

confidence that we can do much more to improve both educational

policy making and its implementation .

Douglas M. Windham

Associate Editor

Preface

11

Preface 9

Introduction 15

Chapter I. Framework for education policy analysis 17

Policy definition and scope 17

Policy making 19

Conceptual framework for policy analysis 23

A. Analysis of the existing situation 24

B. The process of generating policy options 30

C. Evaluation of policy options 32

D. Making the policy decision 34

E. Planning policy implementation 35

F. Policy impact assessment 37

G. Subsequent policy cycles 38

Chapter II. Application of policy analysis in

educational planning activities:

four exemplary cases 40

I. Peru: A case of comprehensive/revolutionary

approach 41

II. Jordan: A case of going from the incremental

to the comprehensive 46

III. Thailand: A case of going from the specific

to the strategic 53

Contents

13

IV. Burkina Faso: A case of externally influenced

comprehensive approach 59

Chapter III. Lessons from the cases 68

Peru 70

Jordan 72

Thailand 73

Burkina Faso 75

Synthesis across cases 77

Analysis of the existing situation 78

The process of generating policy options 78

The process of evaluating policy options 80

Adoption of the policy decision 81

Policy planning and implementation 82

Policy impact assessment and subsequent

policy cycle 85

Chapter IV. Conclusion - summary implications for

planners 88

Selected references and further reading 91

Contents

14

Introduction

This booklet analyzes educational policy making as a cornerstone of

(Fundamental) educational planning. The policy analysis framework

and case studies presented here provide planners with both a conceptual

and an operational guide for understanding the critical linkages in

the policy-planning process for education.

Chapter I offers an integrated model of educational decision

making that emphasizes the role of the formal policy-making process

(and its analytical rationality) within the context of the key policy

actors (from the administrative and political context). To capture the

details of the decision-making process itself, an analytical framework

is presented that goes beyond the initial decision point to examine both

the preceding actions (contextual assessment, technical analysis, and

the generation, valuation, and selection of policy options) and the subsequent

activities (planning and conducting implementation, impact

assessment, and, where appropriate, remediation and redesign). Thus,

the framework covers the full policy-planning process but with a focus

on the facilitating and constraining effects that policy decisions (and

how they were derived) can have on the choices available to educational

planners.

In Chapter 1l, the framework is applied to four exemplary case

studies of the educational policy cycle. The four cases (Peru,

Jordan, Thailand, and Burkina Faso) were selected because suff icient

data (and elapsed time) exist on each to allow discussion of

the full policy cycle; also, the geographical, economic, pedagogical,

and political diversity of the examples emphasizes that the

policy framework presented here is generic and not limited in

15

applicability by any of these factors. Chapter 111 summarizes the lessons

from and across the case studies, and identifies the elements in the

policy-planning process that appear to have contributed to the success

or failure of policy reforms. Chapter IV summarizes the implications

for planners.

This analysis should be of value to educational planners in two

major ways. First, the methodology of the framework and conclusions

of the case studies should help in the analysis of current educational

policies and decision-making procedures (an analysis of policy).

Second, the framework can be applied to the evaluation of proposed

policies and used to forecast policy outcomes and the probability of

successful implementation, given the country context of fiscal and

managerial capacity, political commitment, etc. (an analysis for policy).

Planning that is not based on a solid understanding of educational

policy making will fail; it will fail not primarily because of any technical

planning errors but because the planners did not understand why

and how these policies evolved and how planning results should lead

to new cycles of policy analysis and formulation.

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

16

Chapter I. Framework for education policy analysis

The notion of educational planning - making the education sector grow

and function more effectively - may implicitly suggest a well structured

field of unambiguous issues, clearly defined objectives, mutually

exclusive choices, undisputed causal relationships, predictable rationalities,

and rational decision-makers. Accordingly, sector analysis has

predominantly focused on the content - the 'what' of educational development:

issues, policies, strategies, measures, outcomes, etc. In

contrast to this simplistic vision, educational planning is actually a

series of untidy and overlapping episodes in which a variety of people

and organizations with diversified perspectives are actively involved -

technically and politically. It entails the processes through which

issues are analyzed and policies are generated, implemented, assessed

and redesigned. Accordingly, an analysis of the education sector

implies an understanding of the education policy process itself - the

'how' and 'when' of educational development. The purpose of this section

is to suggest a scheme or series of steps through which sound and

workable policies can be formulated, and then, through effective planning,

put into effect, evaluated and redesigned.

Policy definition and scope

Since the policy process is a crucial element in educational

planning, it is essential to clarify the concepts of 'policy' and

'policy making' before proceeding any further. Understandably,

competing definitions of 'policy' are numerous and varied. For the

17

purposes of this paper, policy is defined functionally to mean:

 

An

explicit or implicit single decision or group of decisions which may set

out directives for guiding future decisions, initiate or retard action, or

guide implementation of previous decisions

 

. Policy making is the first

step in any planning cycle and planners must appreciate the dynamics

of policy formulation before they can design implementation and evaluation

procedures effectively.

Policies, however, differ in terms of their scope, complexity, decision

environment, range of choices, and decision criteria. This range is

schematically depicted in

 

F i g u re 1

. Issue-specific policies are

short-term decisions involving day-to-day management or, as the term

implies, a particular issue. A programme policy is concerned with the

design of a programme in a particular area, while a multi-programme

policy decision deals with competing programme areas. Finally, strategic

decisions deal with large-scale policies and broad resource allocations.

For example:

Strategic

 

: How can we provide basic education at a reasonable cost to

meet equity and efficiency objectives?

Multi-programme

 

: Should resources be allocated to primary education

or to rural training centres?

Programme

 

: How should training centres be designed and provided

across the country?

Issue-specific:

 

Should graduates of rural centres be allowed to go into

intermediate schools?

Another example:

Strategic:

 

Should we or do we need to introduce diversified education?

Multi-programme

 

: How should we allocate resources between general

education, vocational education, and diversified education?

Programme

 

: How and where should we provide diversified education?

Issue-specific

 

: How should practical subjects be taught in diversified

schools?

O b v i o u s l y, the broader the scope of a policy is, the more problematic

it becomes. Methodological and political issues become

more pronounced such as, definition of the problem in conflictive

societies; use of analytical techniques and optimization;

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

18

questions of proper theoretical base, measurement, valuation and

aggregation; hard objective data vs. soft subjective data; and technical

analysis vs. public participation. For a more detailed treatment of this

subject, refer to Michael Carley (1980).

Figure 1. Policy scope

Policy making

The term 'policy making' like 'policy' implies competing conceptions

and assumptions. A study of the theoretical and empirical work of

social scientists reveals the two essential dimensions of policy making:

who does it (the actors) and how (the process). Historically, the actor

in policy making has been considered unitary and rational; more

recently policy analysts have introduced the organizational (public

interest) model and the personalistic (self-interest) model. The process

element has fluctuated between a synoptic (comprehensive) approach

and an incremental approach.

C. Lindblom and D.K. Cohen (1979) laid out the differences between

the synoptic and incremental methods of policy making.

Framework for education policy analysis

19

According to him, the synoptic method entails, in its extreme form,

one single central planning authority for the whole of society, combining

economic, political, and social control into one integrated planning

process that makes interaction unnecessary. It assumes: (a) that

the problem at hand does not go beyond man's cognitive capacities and

(b) there exist agreed criteria (rather than social conflict on values) by

which solutions can be judged and (c) that the problem- solvers have

adequate incentives to stay with synoptic analysis until it is completed

(rather than 'regress' to using incremental planning.)

Incremental policy making, on the other hand, relies on interaction

rather than on a complete analysis of the situation to develop a blueprint

for solving problems. The incremental approach to policy making

is built on the following assumptions: (a) Policy options are based on

highly uncertain and fluid knowledge, and are in response to a dynamic

situation (everchanging problems, and evolving contexts); (b) No

'correct' solution can therefore be found, or technically derived from a

diagnosis of the situation. Thus, no sweeping or drastic reforms should

be attempted; (c) Only incremental and limited policy adjustments can

be made; and (d) Policy adjustments are expected to remedy an experienced

dissatisfaction with past policies, improving the existing situation

or relieving an urgent problem. Consequently, these adjustments

should be tentative - and in some cases temporary - and must be revised

as the dynamics of the situation evolve.

G . T. Allison (1971) developed two alternative models to the commonly

assumed model of the unitary rational policy-maker: (a) the

O rganizational process model, and (b) the governmental politics model.

The first model assumes a complex government consisting of a conglomerate

of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial

life of its own. Decisions are based on the output of the several entities,

functioning independently according to standard patterns of behaviour

but partially co-ordinated by government leaders. The second

model carries this concept further. While it also assumes an org a n i z a t i onal

approach to decision making, the Governmental Politics model plays

up the part of individuals in the process. Government decisions are not

made by a monolithic state based on rational choice, but rather are

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

20

negotiated by various leaders who sit on top of the organizations involved

in that particular decision-making process. Each leader is compelled

by his own conception of the problem as well as by the imperatives

of his organization and his own personal goals.

A consolidated model for policy making. Neither of the two dimensions

alone (process and actors) fully captures the dynamics of policy

making. They need to be combined and restructured into a different

configuration, as the topography in Figure 2 illustrates.

Figure 2. Dimensions of policy making

Framework for education policy analysis

21

The actor in policy making is placed on the horizontal-axis - at one

end of the spectrum is the societal/personalistic mode, wherein decisions

are reached by negotiation among a variety of interest groups (including

government ministries, teachers' unions, etc.), driven by their own

conception of the problem and individual values. On the other end is the

o rganizational/bureaucratic mode wherein decisions are made within the

o rganizational entity (i.e. the military, the international community, etc.).

The process of policy making - from the incremental to the synoptic

approach - is placed on the vertical-axis. These two dimensions generate

a new topography.

On the one extreme of this new topography (in quadrant I) is the rational

model which is a composite of the synoptic method and the org a n izational/

bureaucratic mode. Decision making at this extreme is unitary,

rational, centrally controlled, completely technical and value maximizing.

On the other extreme (in quadrant III) is a composite of the incremental

method and the societal/personalistic mode. Policy making here is

a political activity characterized by self-interest, political barg a i n i n g ,

value judgement and multiple rationalities. One can easily argue that

most policy making falls somewhere between these two extremes.

Analytic techniques caried on in ignorance of political, social and bureaucratic

realities do not go very far. Similarly, a pattern of vague and unsystematic

political decisions loaded with self-interest, patronage and value

judgements can lead to breakdown, if not to chaos.

In sum, a balanced perspective of policy making places analytical

rationality within the context of political and institutional aspects of policy

making. This is in line with Douglas North's pioneering work on institutional

economics that gained him the Nobel Prize in 1 993. In addition

to modifying the rationality postulate, he extended the economic theory

by incorporating ideas and ideologies into the analysis and allotted a fundamental

role to institutions for societal change: they are "the underlying

determinant of the long-run performance of economies". (North 1990).

This balanced view of policy making is most appropriate for education.

Studies of educational policy making all point to the complexity

and multifaceted character of this process due to the nature

of both the educational system and the educational change.

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

22

One of the more important characteristics of the education system lies in

its salient linkages with the socio-economic structure. Any policy

changes, therefore, are not purely technical but have sociop

o l i t i c a l-economic dimensions. For instance, any attempt to modify the

system, which is perceived by one group or another as lowering the

chances of their children to progress socially or economically, will meet

with strong opposition. Therefore, the whole notion of reform for democratization

is essentially a political issue. Another complex set of linkages

exists between the education system and the economy, whereby the

school is seen as the solution to a wide range of economic problems. T h i s

belief is the source of much of the impetus for policy changes.

I n t e r n a l l y, the educational system is an intricate network of institutions

interlocking horizontally and vertically. A policy decision in any one

component can have strong repercussions throughout the system.

E x t e r n a l l y, education seems to be everyone's business and nearly everyone

feels qualified to have an opinion about it. Policy making, therefore,

involves balancing a number of contradictory demands, and soliciting

support, or at least tolerance, from the many different segments of society

which have an interest in education.

Conceptual framework for policy analysis

Although decision making is a crucial event in the policy process, clearly

it is preceded by analytical and/or political activities (analysis, generation of

options, bargaining, etc.) and followed by equally important planning activities

(implementation, assessment, and possible redesign). This booklet introduces

a framework for education policy analysis that covers the pre-p o l i c y

decision activities, the decision process itself, and the post-decision planning

activities. This framework is not a description of actual activities, but rather

a conceptual model to extract and specify those elements that can be detected

and analyzed. It therefore should be broad enough to capture and integrate

the intricate process of any policy making model (Figure 2), yet at the same

time it should disaggregate the process into components to determine how

they work and interact. The resultant framework, summarized

Framework for education policy analysis

23

schematically in Figure 3 and discussed in detail below, consists of seven

p o l i c y-planning processes, the first four of which deal with policy making,

the fifth with planning and sixth and seventh with policy adjustment:

(i) Analysis of the existing situation.

(ii) The generation of policy options.

(iii) Evaluation of policy options.

(iv) Making the policy decision.

(v) Planning of policy implementation.

(vi) Policy impact assessment.

(vii) Subsequent policy cycles.

This framework looks complicated because, inevitably, it is multifaceted

and covers a wide range of processes. However, any attempt to

restrict policy analysis to certain elements or to disregard one element

results in an incomplete approach to policy analysis, and leads to the

historical controversy of the rational vs. the political, or the bureaucratic

vs. the organizational approaches in the literature and in public

debate. The above seven elements of the framework will be used to

frame the case studies in Chapter II and the conclusions in Chapter III.

A. Analysis of the existing situation

A policy change is normally a response to a problem or set of problems

in the sector, and must, therefore, start with an appreciation of

the educational sector and its context. In addition to the analysis of the

sector itself, policy analysis should consider a number of aspects of the

social context, including political, economic, demographic, cultural,

and social issues which are likely to affect the decision making and

even implementation processes of the education sector.

Country background

The general character of a country (location, geography,

population, culture, and social stratification patterns) has obvious

Education policy-planning process:

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24

implications for education policy analysis. This makes the process of

educational policy making more difficult and in a number of ways.

Typically different groups have different values about the role of education.

Insofar as education represents access to economic and political

power, then different access or interest in education also means differential

access to power. Resulting conflicts and struggles are particularly

acute in countries where the distribution of access to goods and

services has become increasingly unequal.

Political context

The preceding observation emphasizes that an analysis of the political

environment is necessary for an understanding of the national

decision-making process, the comparative value of education, and the

role that education must play in the socio-political process. It is worth

distinguishing between the priorities of the national political elite relative

to development and those of the educational elite relative to education.

It is not only that the head of the ministry of education may

have different plans from those of the political elite which appointed

him but in many countries there is considerable autonomy provided to

the educational sector. It is not at all unusual for the two sets of objectives

to be at odds with each other or at least not to be tightly intertwined.

The capacity of the state to do planning at the national level is another

critical variable in the institutional analysis of the political sector.

Moreover, the professional background of the bureaucrats who do the

policy planning and where they have been trained (perhaps in foreign

universities) can also affect the ideology of the elite.

Finally, the institutional structure of the political sector has implications

for educational development. Many developing countries do

not have well developed parties but if they do, their values and preferences

need to be calculated as part of the analysis of the political

context.

Framework for education policy analysis

25

Figure 3. Conceptual framework for policy analysis

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

26

Figure 3. (continued)

Framework for education policy analysis

27

Economic context

In this area, the analyst wants to understand the present macro-e c o n omic

situation in general and the human resources situation in particular. It

is, however, more important to estimate the likely trends in the various

sectors in the future and the financial resources of the country in order to

assess what the economy requires from the education sector and what the

sector expects to face from the rest of the economy, particularly in terms

of general infrastructure and financial resources.

First, variables such as demographic shifts, urbanization, and migration,

coupled with the likely growth in various sectors of the economy,

will have a significant impact on labour markets and consequently on

needs for education and skill training. Second, the level of economic

development will set enormous constraints on the capacity of the educational

system to build schools and to expand. It is difficult to build schools

without the necessary economic infra-structure to say nothing of the presence

of firms with the necessary capabilities. The level of economic

development also sets the range of possible taxation by the government,

which in turn will influence educational expenditures. Third, the economic

growth rate is important not only for estimating the likely need for

certain kinds of skills but also for estimating the future amounts of slack

resources. This is necessary because, as the rate of growth increases, more

funds are often made available to education; by the same token, as it

decreases, allocations to education are among the first cut.

Education sector

Sector analysis starts with an identification and understanding

of the major sectoral issues relevant to the country. These issues

may be explored under six categories: (i) access to educational

opportunities; (ii) equity in the distribution of educational services;

(iii) structure of the education system; (iv) internal efficiency; (v)

external efficiency; and (vi) institutional arrangements for the

management of the sector. For a full description of these components

and the analytic techniques utilized refer to Haddad and

Education policy-planning process:

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28

Demsky (1994), Kemmerer (1994), Coombs and Hallak (1987),

Mingat and Tan (1988), and Windham (1988a, 1988b).

An analysis of the above issues should take into consideration their evolutionary

nature: how have issues in the development of the educational

system changed over time? The meeting of one educational need or solution

of one problem frequently creates another. For example, the expansion

of the system and the provision of new facilities naturally lead to issues

about the quality of the education provided and the capacity of the educational

administration to handle a larger educational system. In addition, the

analysis of education across time can sensitize one to the tendency for the

system to oscillate between objectives which are somewhat incompatible.

A historical and evolutionary perspective on the dynamics of policies

across time allows the analyst a better sense of why a particular policy is

being advocated at the moment. By studying the past, one also learns the

likely speed with which educational policies can be implemented.

Dynamics of change

An assessment of the present situation cannot be complete without evaluating

the forces for or against change in the event that policy changes

need to be made. Such an assessment has implications for the chances of

success of different types of policies and for strategies that must be

employed to promote and implement such policies. Nobel laureate North

(1994) confesses that "there is no greater challenge facing today's social

scientists than the development of a dynamic theory of social change".

Meanwhile, he asserts that "individuals and organizations with barg a i n i n g

power as a result of the institutional framework have a crucial stake in perpetuating

the system". One key socio-political factor to analyze, therefore,

is the presence and relative strength of interest groups.

In developing countries it is impossible to specify what might

be all the relevant interest groups but at minimum one can start

with the providers of education, most notably, teachers, and the

consumers, most notably, parents, students and employers. If the

former are well organized - they often are - they can be a powerful

force in supporting or opposing any educational change. T h e i r

Framework for education policy analysis

29

interests are likely to be threatened if the educational change results in

some challenge to their status or prerogatives. The consumers can also be

powerful, but are generally fragmented. They may be divided into diff erent

cultural or occupational, or socio-economic groups. Frequently, these

will have quite different interests in both the quantity and quality of education.

Consumer groups most closely connected with either political polic

y-makers or decisionmakers within the education system will be able to

exert disproportionate influence. In addition, consumers who can org a n ize

themselves into forceful street demonstrations, as have some university

students, can effect policy changes very favourable to themselves.

Therefore, policy planners need to identify interest groups and assess their

openness to reform. For those interest groups identified as anti-r e f o r m ,

planners need to determine how well organized they are, how much power

they have in society, and how willing they are to exercise their power.

A separate interest group comprises the officials who adrninister an

education system. Studies suggest that bureaucrats find it in their

s e l f-interest to maintain a moderate expansion of the educational system.

They tend also to value whatever configuration of education is current and

to resist policies that would alter it. Therefore, one important element in

policy analysis is to understand what the self-interests of the educational

bureaucrats are and to recognize that these are not necessarily identical

with those of the teachers, other educational professionals or consumers.

F i n a l l y, the pressure to see change happen can come from individuals or

groups outside the education sector (as in the case of Peru, described in

Chapter II) or from external actors, both individual experts and development

agencies (as is the case of Burkina Faso).

B.The process of generating policy options

New policies are usually generated when the present situation

of the sector and its context is perturbed by a problem, a political

decision or a reorganization scheme (overall national planning).

Policy options can be generated in several different ways to

accommodate the disequilibrium. For analytical purposes one can

group these processes under the following four modes: systemic,

Education policy-planning process:

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30

incremental, ad hoc and importation. In concrete situations, though,

several of these modes may be combined.

The systemic mode

The title may suggest that this is the preferred or best method for

generating policy options. This is not necessarily the case because

under certain conditions this mode may prove to be defective or

impractical. The systemic mode is characterized by three operations:

generation of data, formulation and prioritization of options, and refining

options. Data are usually derived from two sources: sector analysis,

and the existing body of professional knowledge (conventional

wisdom, research synthesis, comparative indicators, etc.).

Formation of options under this mode is a fairly complicated process

of induction. If based on data alone, a large number of options can

be generated to fit the different 'givens' of the sector and its context. At

its extreme, intellectual induction seeks to anticipate all possible policy

outcomes by thinking through all possible contingencies. It then

proceeds to identify optimal or at least efficient options. However, a

variety of intellectual, political, social and professional constraints

limit the range of policy options. Moreover, options may be given different

weights and priorities depending on the perceived importance of

the sectoral issues, the relative strength of the interest groups, and the

possible combination of different options.

Some of the policy options may be subjected to a microcycle of problem

identification: policy formulation - verification - modification or

retention. This is a blend of induction and sequential interaction. The

experimentation or pilot studies approach adds an input into the data

base and to the 'weighting' of the policy options.

The incremental mode

Once a problem within the educational system is recognized,

then a solution is frequently forced upon the system. This is especially

likely to occur when there is a public debate about a problem.

Given widespread interest and discussion, the educational

Framework for education policy analysis

31

system is forced to do something to maintain its legitimacy. The sense

of urgency necessitates a quick response. Since the problem is likely to

be located in one particular segment of the system, then the issue is

how to formulate a policy to adapt the system to the response. This is

sometimes called the 'acting out' approach whereby the policymaker

seeks to adjust present difficulties rather than to anticipate future ones,

thereby promoting incremental improvements.

The ad hoc mode

Sometimes the problem is outside the educational system. It may

not even be a problem but instead the emergence of a new elite or a

major political event which requires that the educational system make

some adjustments or changes. Here the policy may have no rational

basis within the education sector.

The importation mode

There are many innovations and fashions in educational systems

around the world. These can be the source of the policy options considered.

Foreign specialists, operating as consultants for international

agencies, can provide the stimulus for this mode.

However, a certain policy adopted elsewhere can be imported successfully

only if it meets the needs of particular groups in the society,

i.e. if there is an importer.

C. Evaluation of policy options

Policy options can be evaluated only if alternative scenarios are

developed to allow estimations of the likely implications of the options

considered. The 'imaginary' situation that would be created if a policy

option were implemented is compared with the present situation, and

the scenario of transition from the existing to the imaginary case is

evaluated in terms of desirability, affordability, and feasibility.

Education policy-planning process:

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32

Desirability

This involves three dimensions: (1) The impact of the option on the

various interest groups or stakeholders: who would benefit? who might feel

threatened? how might the potential losers be compensated? what would

make the option desirable to all stakeholders? (2) compatibility with the

dominant ideology and targets of economic growth articulated in national

development plans; and (3) in some cases, the impact of a policy option on

political development and the stability.

A f f o rd a b i l i t y

The fiscal costs of the change as well as the social and political costs

need to be evaluated. The difficulty of making these estimations lies in the

ability to predict future trends, including economic growth. This is especially

important because educational expenditures are more vulnerable to

changes in economic situations and political objectives than some other

kinds of public expenditure. Therefore, alternative economic scenarios

need to be considered. Further, private costs (will a reform require consumers

to share the costs, and if so what happens to the poorer groups?),

opportunity costs (are there other measures which might benefit the education

system, but would have to be foregone to pay for the current proposal?)

and political costs (if an option favours one group over another, is the

government willing to pay the political cost?) should also be weighed..

F e a s i b i l i t y

Another and very different kind of implication is the availability

of human resources for implementing the change. Fiscal resources

are easy to compute. More difficult is the estimate of what level of

training is required of teachers (the more sophisticated the programme

and/or technology involved, the more highly trained the personnel

need to be) and whether there are enough personnel to implement

the policy option. In many developing countries, highly trained

personnel may be in short supply. This then raises the

Framework for education policy analysis

33

question of whether they can be imported or trained and at what cost.

Equally important is the presence of the institutional culture (norms,

procedures, environment) necessary to attract, retain, and effectively

utilize trained personnel in transforming policies into plans and implemented

programmes. Another element in the calculus of feasibility is

time. Most studies of education projects indicate that there are frequent

time overruns in implementation. More realistic estimates of time need

to be made and can only be done by the careful assessment of the

implementation capabilities and experiences.

The issue of sustainability should fare prominently when the above

criteria are applied. Education initiatives have to be sustained politically

and financially over a lengthy period of time to reach fruition. To

ensure that, the long-term implications of policy options should be

weighed within an overall sectoral policy, itself embedded in a prudent

macro framework, and consistent with long-term national aspirations.

D. Making the policy decision

Rarely would a policy decision be the considered consequence of the

evaluation and previous stages of the decision process - the culmination

of a process during which all information relevant to the decision was

gathered and carefully analyzed so that a totally optimal policy might

be designed and selected. The variety of conflicting interests and rationalities

requires that the policy which is selected engineers 'trade-o ff s '

among these interests. The resulting policy may not be optimal for any

single interest group, but such a bargained result is necessary to have

the broad base of political support which will be needed to take the policy

from the drawing board to implementation. In addition, political

pressures, oversights in evaluation, or the simple pressure of time may

short-circuit the process. A minister with a 'pet idea', for instance, may

decide to move directly from his view of the current situation to policy

decision, short-cutting the three stages of the process described above.

Thus, to assess the soundness of the decision process up to this stage, it

is useful to ask questions such as the following:

Education policy-planning process:

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34

(1) How was the decision made - did it go through all the stages of

policy analysis?

(2) How radical a departure is the decision from current policy?

(3) How consistent is this decision with policies of other sectors?

(4) Is the policy diffusely articulated or is it stated in a manner

which is easily measurable?

(5) Does the policy seem operational or is its implementation

implausible?

E.Planning policy implementation

Once a policy has been chosen, planning for policy implementation

should begin immediately. Although much of the work that must be

carried out during this stage can be based on evaluations performed to

make the policy decision, planning for implementation involves a

concreteness absent in earlier stages of the policy process.

What was abstract during the evaluation stage begins to become

concrete during planning. A schedule for moving people, physical

objects and funds must be drawn up with a clarity and attention to

detail that leaves no doubt as to who will do what, when and how; physical

resources, once the content of hypothetical lists, must be located

and their availability assured; financial resources, once ear-marked for

possible use, must be appropriated so that implementation delays are

minimal; the personnel needed to put plans into action must be freed

from other commitments and made ready to go to work; the technical

knowledge needed to guide the policy implementation must be mastered

by those who will employ it; and the administrative systems within

which the policy will be directed must be clearly structured and firmly

in place.

Ambitious as these tasks are, there is one planning task that is

more difficult (and it is the most often over-looked). This is the

task of mobilizing political support. The mobilization of political

support resonates most clearly when one thinks of the need to

ensure that the providers and consumers of a new educational initiative

embrace it with enthusiasm. Plans must be developed so

Framework for education policy analysis

35

that students and their families are aware of the objectives of a new initiative,

that communities learn of benefits for the collectivity; programmes

for teachers, educational administrators and their representatives must

similarly be developed. Since new initiatives usually mean some form of

job re-definition, it is important that educators see this as beneficial and

that those who object to the changes be isolated. Political mobilization

may also be necessary to ensure that materials for school construction are

available when needed, that needed institutional administrative adjustments

are carried out, and, especially, that funding proposals are approved.

One important strategy for mobilizing political support is that of involving

groups affected by the new initiative in the planning process. This will pay

dividends not only in the form of enhanced support, but, more likely, in

terms of an improved policy design.

Asignificant amount of planning and even de facto policy formulation

take place during actual implementation. This is the case because, during

implementation, the following is the rule rather than the exception:

(a) circumstances related to implementation constraints cause policy

modifications to take place;

(b) feedback obtained during implementation causes reassessment

of aspects of the policy decision and subsequent modifications

by policymakers; and

(c) the mere translation of abstract policy intentions into concrete

implementation causes re-assessment and re-design. T h e s e

changes occur with great frequency because, unfortunately,

implementation problems are often greatly under-estimated

during the stage of policy planning.

Misjudging ease of implementation is, perhaps, the most frequent

error in policy planning. No matter how deeply the various

groups affected by a new initiative have been involved in reviewing

and shaping plans, the concreteness of the first day of a new programme,

often casts it in a new light. Implementation is the time

when one discovers that schedules are unrealistic and that programmes

are over-ambitious; it is the time when the ravages of

inflation cause the teachers' union to demand a pay increase prior

to using the new texts; it is the time when parents conclude that the

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

36

certification offered by the new programme may not guarantee their children

the jobs they hoped for; and it is the time when local politicians decide

that they should block the initiative since it will be so successful that it

will prove that the politicians in the capital are better providers than they.

Such problems are often replays of issues raised during the stages of evaluating

policy options or of planning, and need to be solved by taking a

flexible approach to the stage of policy implementation.

No matter how well anticipated, policy implementation always

brings some surprises. These shape the policy output, sometimes in

crucial ways. One way to use such surprises to improve policy outcomes

is to design the implementation in stages. If unanticipated problems

arise at a given stage, then a re-evaluation of the plans for implementation,

and possibly of the policy decision itself, is in order.

Another way is to conduct well designed pilot studies, before full

implementation of any projects. Problems of going to scale and the

dangers of the 'greenhouse' projects that cannot survive implantation in

the real world are well treated in Kemmerer (1990).

F. Policy impact assessment

Once the policy has been in place long enough to produce results, a

policy assessment check can take place. To carry this out, it is necessary to

have some sense of how long it should take for the policy, once implemented,

to take hold. While policy output measurement can be carried out

on a continual basis, premature attempts at assessment can mis-state the

e ffectiveness of the policy. Furthermore, it is preferable to delay final

assessment until a number of teaching cycles have transpired to separate

the effect of the content of the policy change from the excitement which

often accompanies implementing a new initiative for the first time. On the

other hand, the sooner accurate assessment takes place, the sooner polic

y-makers can know if their initiatives are working as anticipated or if

adjustments in policy design or policy implementation are required.

If assessment reveals that the policy outcome is lacking, it is

necessary to determine whether the policy itself is inadequate, or

Framework for education policy analysis

37

whether poor implementation is at fault. Human capital inadequacies,

under-funding, or inadequate economic stimulus during the implementation

stage are among the many possible causes of failure of a well

designed policy. On the other hand, if assessment reveals deficiencies

in outcomes and if implementation can be shown to have been well

done, then it is necessary to re-examine the policy decision and to

determine what adjustments or what new policies should be substituted

for the original choice. Once this is accomplished, then one moves

again to the planning and implementation stages. Given the rapid pace

of contemporary change and the intimate links between the educational

system and the rest of society, even successfully conceived and

implemented initiatives require adjustments over time.

Policy impact assessment is carried out using the same criteria

employed during the policy evaluation stage. The assessment process

revolves around the following questions: What have been the actual

impacts of the policies in question? Are these impacts desirable given

the changes that were hoped for? Are the changes affordable? Did

costs prevent their full implementation? Did cost over-runs make it

unthinkable to implement them over a longer term or on a wider basis?

Can the policy be lived with politically and socially? Are the impacts

feasible? Were full impacts accomplished? Would exceptional efforts

be required to replicate thesc impacts in other circumstances?

G. Subsequent policy cycles

If a policy initiative is carried out systematically, the process of policy

design, planning, implementation, impact assessment, and re-d e s i g n

will become iterative, and, in theory, infinitely so, as Figure 3 suggests.

U n f o r t u n a t e l y, long-term policy analysis and planning is not often carried

out in such a fashion. Often the results of verification are not ploughed

back into policy. Instead, verification is often seen as a stock-t a k i n g

exercise, needed in order to close the books on a policy initiative. Later

in the country's history, when policy change is once again needed in the

educational area under discussion, a policy process often begins de novo

and may duplicate much of the analysis, derivation of alternative

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

38

options, evaluation, and planning carried out earlier. The conclusion,

then, of policy analysis is never to conclude. Ideally, once implementation

has been completed and policy outcomes are forthcoming, a

policy impact assessment stage ensues, leading potentially to a new

policy cycle.

Framework for education policy analysis

39

Chapter II. Application of policy analysis in

educational planning activities: four

exemplary cases

The above conceptual framework (Chapter I and Figure 3) is applied

in this Chapter to four exemplary case studies to reconstruct the dimensions

of policy-making and planning (processes and actors) over time.

Certain specific educational reforms in Peru, Jordan, Thailand and

Burkina Faso were selected because sufficient data (and elapsed time)

exist on each to allow discussion of the full policy cycle (or cycles in

some cases); also, the geographical, economic, pedagogical, and political

diversity of the cases emphasizes that the policy framework is

generic and not limited in applicability by any of these factors.

Each case study documents the process of policy making and

recreates a real situation. It tries to represent as accurately as possible

the factual background and setting of the event(s) in question, identify

the key issues and players, present the information and actions leading

to a policy decision, and document the events that took place during

implementation. Moreover, case studies simulate the dynamics of decision-

making, which include the process of asking questions, evaluating

data, assessing what kinds of policy actions are practicable, negotiating,

competing between interest groups, and trading off between

different constraints and benefits.

In all cases, the following questions were posed:

• Were the educational issues diagnosed and analyzed within the

appropriate socio-economic and political context?

• Were all policy options to deal with these issues identified?

• Were the implications of such options properly derived?

40

• Were these implications fully evaluated in terms of their desirability,

affordability, and implementability?

• Was implementation of policy well planned and executed to allow

for feedback and modifications?

• Was the impact of the policy properly assessed in order to determine

whether to continue the policy, modify it, or go on to a new policy

cycle?

• Were the countries' responses to assessment of the policy cycle

appropriate?

• How were subsequent policy cycles similar to, or different from the

initial policy-making cycle?

To answer these questions the policy process was analyzed, step by step,

examining events within the context of the conceptual framework and the elements

laid out in Chapter I. The basis for the analysis was an extensive review

of World Bank and other relevant reports of international and bilateral agencies,

government documents, and research papers. Understandably, the scope of the

information, analysis and conclusions are constrained by the availability, scope

and nature of the data base. In order to make up for these constraints, interviews

were conducted whenever feasible with participants in, or close observers of,

some phases of the policy process. Below are concise summaries of each case;

detailed analyses are in Haddad and Demsky (1994).

I. Peru: a case of comprehensive/revolutionary

approach

Peru provides a case where a government undertook policy reform in the

synoptic, comprehensive model. The reform embraced the entire education

system, from primary school all the way through to the university.

It aimed at integrating practical and academic subjects in ways that

would provide the country with the intellectual power and the complete

range of skills to achieve sustained economic and social development. It

aimed equally at resolving issues of equity and external eff i c i e n c y. T h i s

policy was well calculated and comprehensive, and was developed

through a systematic process of diagnosis, response and action within a

Application of policy analysis in educational

planning activities: four exemplary cases

41

carefully planned programme. The reform, however, was considered a

failure.

The context of policy formulation (Situation A)

Frustrated for more than a decade with the seeming inefficiency of civilian

governments, in 1968, a group of military officers, led by Velasco, had

overthrown the democratically elected government of Fernando Belaunde

Te r r y. The Peru which had frustrated the officers was a country of deep

income inequality, massive rural-urban migration, exploding birth rates,

poor health care, desperate unemployment, rampant inflation, and a failing

educational system.

The educational system was also chaotic and politicized. The teachers'

union had long been the most militant and best organized national labour

o rganization. Provision of education was inadequate by any measure:

across social classes it was more unequally distributed than income; most

graduates were trained for non-existent white collar jobs, and few gained

technical skills; enrolment and retention rates were alarmingly low; and

many areas of the country lacked any kind of educational facility.

What was the potential for change? The military regime had the ability

to 'force' a reform and a newly bolstered economy could support it.

H o w e v e r, interest groups, teachers, ministries and parents, while unanimously

favouring reforms, had their own ideas to advocate. Moreover, the

Ministry of Education, the obvious implementor of policy change, was

considered ill-equipped to carry out an educational reform as well as a

potential obstacle to change.

The generation of policy options

Due to the revolutionary nature of decision making, the real options were

about which objectives were best suited to revolutionary goals, what educational

policies should be adopted, and how best to effect these policies. Policy

options were conceived by a group of military advisors within a carefully

planned and revolutionary programme of action for reforming the whole

national structure known as the 'Inca Plan.' Because the 1968 promise of

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

42

an overall educational reform had met with widespread scepticism, the

government established a civilian Educational Reform Commission.

Its report, Reform of Peruvian Education General Report, in 1 970,

epitomized the revolutionary style of generating policy options

through rational deduction: diagnosis, response, action.

The Commission, after diagnosing the education system as inequitable,

i n e fficient, outmoded and rigid, and lacking a Peruvian spirit, considered

that the response could not be less than an education that aimed to create

'the new Peruvian man in a new Peruvian society.' The only logical option

to meet this objective and address all the defects simultaneously was a thorough

restructuring of the system to provide universal diversified secondary

schooling (ESEPs) to all. This option was consistent with an emerging

educational policy in the international community.

Evaluation of policy options

The policy objectives and elements of the entire reform were evaluated

at three separate points: (1) when the military seized power with

the promise of 'revolutionary' egalitarian reform; (2) under the

Education Reform Commission; and (3) during a two-year public

review process. At each stage, implications were drawn, although not

systematically, for the impact the proposed policy would have on

Situation A, Figure 3.

The desirability of the reform was driven by the military's ideological

perspective that the reform was the key to the realization of their

goals of 'the liberation of man' and 'the creation of a new society' based

on Christian humanist values and equitable treatment of all citizens.

Affordability was assumed by the General Report which suggested that

the reform would be self-financing. The Ministry of Finance undertook

a more serious study of affordability, but assumptions regarding revenue

to finance the reform continued to be hazy. Likewise, the feasibility

of the reform was inadequately evaluated: a full analysis of how to

provide the necessary human resources was never conducted, and

though a schedule had been established, no one took it seriously.

Application of policy analysis in educational

planning activities: four exemplarycases

43

Other groups affected by the proposed policy did not see it as desirable.

University officials and students regarded it as a threat to their

power. The poor and uneducated were also, at best, ambivalent to it.

The military, however, thought that any such reluctance to embrace the

reform would evaporate once it was well understood. For two full

years, therefore, the reform document was widely discussed publicly

and privately with all interested groups. Further, a cadre of young men

and women were sent to different parts of the country to sensitize and

mobilize the public.

Making the policy decision

In 1972, the military announced sweeping reform, covering all levels

and types of education, calling for the participation of the community in

the education process, the reorganization of the country' s education

b u r e a u c r a c y, and the establishment of a curriculum related to Peru's development

requirements. More specifically: Centros de Educación Basica

(CEBs) were to combine the previous primary and secondary education

cycles and reduce them from 11 years to nine; the last two or three years

of basic education were to focus on vocational or practical skills training;

basic education will be followed by Escuelas Superiores de Educación

Profesional (ESEPs), or higher schools of professional education that

combine obligatory academic and practical elements in a three-year programme

and are open to all graduates of basic education. ESEPs would be

the only form of public secondary education in Peru, and graduation from

them would be a requirement for admission to universities.

The new strategic policy was largely based on the 1 970 General

Report, though it also incorporated modifications suggested by vociferous

interest groups during the two-year review period. Essentially, these alterations

were devised to avoid rejection or opposition, rather than as part of

a systematic policy design effort. Chief characteristics of the decision

include: (I) it was reached through a 'synoptic' approach; the President's

Advisory Committee and later the Educational Reform Commission had

conducted a prolonged and extensive study of the entire system and presented

a diagnosis of its problems, logical responses, and policy action to

Education policy-planning process:

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44

be taken; (2) it was a radical departure from the existing situation A,

requiring a proportionate reformation of the institutional infrastructure

(expected to take 15-20 years); and (3) it was consistent with other sectoral

reforms in that they were fashioned around one overall development

plan.

Planning policy implementation

Plans were drawn for a three-phase implementation schedule. T h e y

included: institutional and administrative changes and mobilization of financial,

human, physical, technical, and political resources. The World Bank

and other entities, including UNESCO, USAID, the Canadian International

Development A g e n c y, and the government of Hungary, all played instrumental

roles, promising to provide funding and technical assistance for the

reform, especially the diversified secondary school element.

As implementation proceeded, the 1972 policy was continually and

profoundly modified, due to the low administrative capacity of the

Peruvian government, inadequate human resources, and rising domestic

dissatisfaction with the military government (reflected in lack of

support for the reform) and lack of financial resources. Schedules and

time lines were severely modified, and in the end, the objective of

immediate overall reform was discarded in favour of setting up an

experimental group of ESEPs (as well as basic education centres).

Policy impact assessment

The impact of the educational reform (which resulted in Situation B as

shown in Figure 3) was never formally evaluated against the expected

consequences envisioned in 1972. If it had been, the results would have

been largely negative. Politically, the reform, and especially the ESEPs,

had been associated with the increasingly unpopular military regime and

widely resisted. With very limited implementation, most students were

opting not to enrol in the ESEPs and other reformed schools (enrolment in

the eleven pilot ESEPs was less than 50 per cent of the available places).

Not only did they consider that the new schools would not provide them

Application of policy analysis in educational

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45

with social mobility, but their views were supported by university refusal to

grant admission to ESEP graduates. Further, the quality of teachers in poorer

rural (and especially indigenous Quechua-speaking) areas was below

that of urban schools. In addition, ESEP training did not promise to match

Peru's labour market needs. Finally, economically the ESEPs proved to be

considerably more expensive to operate than the traditional schools. In sum,

though not explicitly evaluated against these criteria, the reform was implicitly

found to be undesirable, unaffordable and infeasible.

The new policy cycle

The newly re-elected Belaunde government (which ousted the military

government in 1980 elections) entered into a new policy cycle, but skipped

directly to the policy decision stage. Despite the lack of formal assessment

of the reform and the lack of any attempt to generate and evaluate alternative

policy options, almost immediately upon assuming office Belaunde decided

to abandon through neglect the 1972 reform, and to reinstate the traditional

education system of his earlier civilian government. Belaunde's choice

of neglect rather than immediate overt rejection was based on relative feasibility

- there just seemed to be no need to confront those interest groups

which still supported the reform when the same results could be had through

a less active approach. Implementation seemed easy operationally, because

few ESEPs and other reformed schools had yet been established. In the end,

a Comprehensive Education Law was passed in 1983 which abolished the

concept of a nine-year basic education followed by the ESEP, and reinstated

the six-year primary school followed by a five-year secondary school divided

into a general two-year cycle and a diversified three-year cycle. T h e

ESEPs became Higher Technical Institutes.

II. Jordan: a case of going from the incremental to the

comprehensive

In the early 1970s, the government of Jordan introduced an

educational policy of secondary school diversification to resolve

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46

issues of manpower supply and employment. Fifteen years later,

prompted by a deteriorating economic situation, the government

undertook another reform that included the expansion of diversified

education, but with substantial curricular changes. These aimed to

increase the attractiveness of diversification to consumers and its relevance

to changing domestic and international economic demands.

Whereas Peru, reforming education during the same period, had used

the synoptic approach, Jordan initially adopted the incremental path.

The context of policy formulation (Situation A)

Though the late 1950s and early 1960s had been a time of rapid economic

growth for Jordan, this was disrupted by the 1967 Arab-Israeli

war which resulted in Jordan's loss of the West Bank - its best agricultural

land and main source of tourism, a massive migration of over

one-quarter million Palestinians to the East Bank. A recovery of the

economy was prevented in 1970 and 1971 by a Jordanian-Palestinian

struggle for control of the country.

The Jordan of the early 1970s was a country in transition. A shortage

of skilled workers was coupled simultaneously with a surplus of

unskilled workers and academically-educated youth. The education

system was thus considered dysfunctional. Only 10 per cent of secondary

school students were in commercial and industrial schools that

were few in number and lacked equipment and adequate curricula, and

academic education and white collar employment were highly valued.

Structurally, the education system had the potential for change

without major obstacles. The highly centralized political power structure

(and education system) could provide the necessary support for

any policy decision. However, various elements of the Jordanian society

had their own notions of what changes would be in their interests

and consistent with their values. The financial resources of the country

could also place constraints on educational change.

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The generation of policy options

Options for policy change were generated on the basis of limited

data and analysis. The government commissioned several studies to

explore the manpower situation and its education and training implications,

which provided an idea of the relative shortages of sub-professionals

and technicians and surpluses of general secondary school

leavers. Meanwhile, after conducting their own sector work and analysis,

the World Bank and UNESCO faulted the over-theoretical nature

of a general education and placed value on offering practical and

occupational subjects at the secondary level.

To address the country's manpower needs noted above, the government

considered four policy options for educational development: (I) continuing

the existing system of general secondary schools predominated with

vocational schools; (II) increasing the number of vocational schools and

reducing the number of general academic schools; (III) modifying the system

through introducing pre-vocational subjects at the preparatory school

level, introducing a new type of post-preparatory vocational institution

(the trade training centre) and introducing diversified education (combining

academic and vocational courses in one institutional setting) at the

secondary level and (IV) introducing a major structural overhaul of the

system, transforming schools into practice facilities where learners of different

age groups would work on real-life situations and in the process

contribute to economic development in the country.

Evaluation of policy options

The policy options were evaluated in a fragmented and informal way.

Option I was evaluated and rejected in terms of desirability and aff o r d a b il

i t y. The government felt a need to change the existing system and cost projections

showed that maintaining the system would be financially unaff o rdable.

Option 11 was considered and rejected mainly in terms of aff o r d a b ility

and desirability. Vocational schools were costly and had low status and

small establishments preferred trainable - not fully trained - candidates-

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Option IV, advanced by UNESCO, was rejected on the grounds that it

was not feasible. Jordanian authorities were not prepared to undertake

such a comprehensive approach (or synoptic, as defined in Chapter I)

calling for a full reorientation of the system that would require an enormous

investment in terms of time, funding and personnel. Option III

was evaluated on the basis of affordability, desirability and feasibility,

although a full range of implications for Situation A in Figure 3 was

never derived. The World Bank was largely responsible for evaluating

the cost factor shown to be within government resources (with a Bank

loan to finance the capital expenditure). Jordanian officials found this

option desirable because comprehensive schooling was touted by the

international community (particularly the World Bank) to increase the

prestige of a vocational education by its association with academic

education. Further, it would provide a flexible basis for meeting the

needs of sectors of the economy whose pattern of development and

specific skill requirements could not be forecast in advance. Despite

that, it was to be introduced as a pilot programme. The incremental

(and therefore low-risk) nature of the policy meant that the demand for

such a reform was never addressed. As noted earlier, parents and students

considered academic education as a means for further education

and upward mobility; the fact that this was not considered would pose

problems when the policy was later adopted.

Making the policy decision

The government policy to introduce comprehensive education was

multi-programme (earlier described in Chapter I), addressing the question

of how to allocate resources between general education, vocational

education, and diversified education. The decision provided for

continuous expansion of a nine-year basic education; introduction of

the concept of comprehensive education; and reorientation of vocational

and technical streams to strengthen industrial programmes, and

development of new specializations and methods of training.

This decision was chosen largely at the urging of the Wo r l d

Bank and, to a certain extent, upon the advice of UNESCO,

Application of policy analysis in educational

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supplemented by its own evaluation. Of critical importance to the decision

was the incremental approach to this policy - education authorities

were content to introduce the policy on a pilot basis.

Planning policy implementation

Since this was to be an incremental approach to policy change,

l o n g-run plans for the implementation were made in broad terms, leaving

the detailed implementation plans for specific projects. As implementation

progressed, there was concern over the division between academic and

vocational education in the project schools. Consequently, the social and

pedagogical integration expected from comprehensive schools did not

take place. Finally, in keeping with the step-b y-step approach to polic

y-making, education authorities decided to pilot another type of vocational

institution, the general vocational secondary school. These were to provide

two or more vocational courses (for example, industry and commerce)

in one institution, and were targeted for thinly populated areas which

otherwise would not have access to vocational schooling.

Policy impact assessment

The impact of the diversification policy was not formally and systematically

evaluated. However, it was scrutinized within the context of a

movement to reform the entire education system in the mid-1980s dictated

by Situation B (Figure 3), characterized by (a) changes in the economic

situation, and (b) performance of the comprehensive schools.

To begin with, the state of the economy, which had greatly improved

during the regional boom of the mid-1970s through the early 1980s

began to turn around. The economic slow down in the Gulf states resulted

in a decline in demand for Jordanian exports, and the unemployment

problem began to re-e m e rge, as displaced Jordanians returned home.

F u r t h e r, projections for 1990 by the World Bank continued to anticipate

a net surplus of workers concentrated in white-collar pursuits.

Performance of the comprehensive schools was considered

mixed. Between 1980 and 1987, the percentage of secondary

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students enrolled in vocational courses increased from 19 per cent to 29 per

cent. However, students and parents continued to look down upon a vocational

education for three reasons: (i) because of the low prestige accorded

to blue-collar jobs; (ii) because the vocational streams in comprehensive

schools offered a curriculum that was inferior to the academic curriculum;

and (iii) because the vocational courses were terminal and therefore did not

provide the opportunity for further education and upward mobility. For these

reasons, the government concluded that comprehensive schools, as they

existed, were not adequate to deal with the new economic situation, and therefore

a change in policy was necessary.

The new policy cycle

The state of the economy in 1985 provided a great deal of incentive to

bring about change that did not exist in the boom times of the late 1970s

and early 1980s, when reform measures were initially discussed. In 1985,

King Hussein appointed a reform committee, the National Commission to

Assess Educational Policies and appointed his brother, the Crown Prince,

to its head. The Commission set up a Central Task Force, appointed field

committees to collect data, and organized a series of workshops and seminars

to examine the education system. This process facilitated the input

into the policy of a broad base of the population.

In generating policy options, the Commission looked closely at the

existing situation (Situation B). It considered the importance of human

capital 'exports', and the government's intentions to change the national

economic structure in favour of the commodity producing sectors in

order to increase their contribution to GDP. Therefore, the Commission

sought to develop a strategic policy (see Chapter I) that would utilize

human capital for both reviving domestic growth and assisting in maintaining

external balances through continued 'exportation' of human

capital. The policy options open to the Commission included: (I) maintaining

the status quo, offering communities the choice of academic

high schools, vocational high schools, comprehensive high schools,

general vocational secondary schools (GVSSs), and trade training

centres; (II) placing even greater emphasis on vocational education,

Application of policy analysis in educational

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increasing the number of vocational schools, GVSSs, and vocational

tracks in comprehensive schools while decreasing the number of academic

schools; (III) introducing incremental reform as in the past, in

the form of modification of the vocational curriculum, introduction of

more practical applications, etc.; and (IV) introducing major reforms

including restructuring the system; reforming the examination process;

creating different streams in comprehensive schools; and introducing

pre-vocational courses at the preparatory level and strengthening in the

curricula for all other levels.

All four options were never fully and comparatively evaluated. T h e

Commission was predisposed to more radical change due in large part to

the prevailing economic problems and the unresponsiveness of the curriculum.

Therefore, Options I, II, and III were not seriously pursued. Option

I V, however, was evaluated fully. Governmental authorities determined

that it would be implementable because there was a political will to see it

happen. It would be affordable because the government would stand

behind it with financial resources and would seek a World Bank loan. T h e

World Bank also examined the affordability of the reform and determined

that it would rest on two factors: the expansion of external assistance

flows, and implementation of cost recovery and cost saving measures.

Contingency plans were also developed in the event of a funding shortfall.

F i n a l l y, it would be desirable to students and parents; it would provide all

students a stronger grounding in basic knowledge and skills through

expansion of the basic schooling cycle, and would also provide vocational

students a better chance of progressing to post-secondary schooling by

strengthening the core curriculum.

There was some institutional opposition as was true in 1980, but

this major reform was passed in 1987 due to a sense of urgency created

by the economic environment, and a political will to see it happen.

Though the Ministry of Education was entrusted with formulating an

implementation plan, in order to circumvent bureaucratic resistance to

the reform, an independent body, the National Centre for Education

Research and Development was established, which has so far succeeded

in overseeing implementation.

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111. Thailand: a case of going from the specific to the

strategic

Around 1966, the government of Thailand introduced a scheme to pilot a new

policy for secondary school diversification. The aim was to resolve a specific

issue: a perceived mismatch between general secondary education and the needs

of a swiftly changing labour market. Initially, the policy was limited to that one

issue and a few schools. About 10 years later, it was expanded on two levels; geographically,

to cover the nation, and politically, to resolve strategic issues of equity,

democratization and national unity. The broadened policy has since been well

received and implemented, and has been relatively successful in meeting its main

objectives.

First Policy Cycle

The context of policy formulation

Thailand, in 1966, was a constitutional monarchy with a fairly stable military

government. It is predominantly rural and multiethnic, which presented something

of a security problem, particularly in the Northeast, exacerbated by security

concerns in neighbouring countries.

The Thai economy, particularly the industrial sector, grew rapidly in the

1960s, but concentrated in the urban areas. The unemployment rate in the

mid-1960s was only about one percent, but the government believed that manpower

shortages had constrained economic growth. Further, manpower projections

forecast a shortage of middle and high level technical personnel while they

expected increasing unemployment among those educated in the liberal arts and

humanities.

Thailand's educational system was elitist and highly academic. Compulsory

education was being expanded from four to seven years, but secondary education

had major problems: (1) access to educational resources - the focus on basic education

was at the expense of secondary education; (2) urban/rural equity; (3)

internal efficiency; and (4) external efficiency - the secondary curriculum

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was highly academic and focused on advancing students to the next

level while the developing Thai economy needed an increasing supply

of skilled workers. Further, vocational secondary schools did not

appear to prepare students for the labour market, according to some

indicative data.

What was the potential for change? The highly-centralized nature of

the system would make it more conducive to change, though the country

had a weak administrative base. However, parents and students

could prove to be a barrier. Culturally, the society prized knowledge as

an end in itself, rather than as a vocational tool. At the same time, Thai

businesses did not value vocational school graduates. Further, teachers

and school administrators preferred the status quo. On the positive

side, funding for reform was available.

The generation of policy options

The Thai authorities wished to modernize the education system to remedy

the above problems. Analysis of the situation came from several fronts.

First, the government of Thailand with the United States Operations

Missions (USOM) formed a Task Force that conducted a number of studies

that focused on the need for middle-level manpower. Also, the Department

of Secondary Education undertook its own study which advocated introducing

comprehensive education on a larger scale. At about the same time, the

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) undertook an examination

of the sector which supported the findings of these studies.

Given the government's concern, then, for future manpower requirements,

it considered the following policy options for secondary education:

(I) continuance of the existing system of college-preparatory

and vocational streaming; (II) reducing the relative importance of college-

preparatory secondary education while greatly increasing vocational

secondary schools; and (III) increasing the role of vocational

secondary schools and introducing comprehensive secondary schools.

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Evaluation of policy options

Policy options were examined in an ad hoc manner. Both the Ministry of

Education and CIDAconducted their own evaluations. Option I was considered

undesirable - the existing system was not adequately meeting the existing

and projected manpower needs of the changing Thai economy. Option II was

also considered undesirable: vocational education was held in low esteem and

did not properly prepare graduates for the workforce. Option III was evaluated

in terms of desirability, feasibility and aff o r d a b i l i t y. It was considered desirable

because an earlier pilot programme in two schools had shown promising

results and because it would provide an education better suited to local conditions

and thereby make some impact on rural development. In addition, the

prevailing international educational ideology supported such an approach over

a dysfunctional academic model. This option would be implementable because

it could draw upon the experience of the earlier schools. Finally, it would be

more affordable than greatly increasing the places in vocational schools. CIDA

and USAID strongly supported this option, as did a select group of Ministry

of Education authorities and educational experts.

Making the policy decision

The Thai government chose policy option III to address future manpower

needs and to change the aspirations of secondary school graduates. It

can therefore be considered 'issue-oriented' as described in Chapter I.

E s s e n t i a l l y, the decision was to introduce a strong 'practical' curriculum to

the existing college-preparatory and vocational curricula, which would

train large numbers of secondary graduates in mathematics, science and

applied areas, who would be trainable on the job for many different kinds

of positions in trades, sales, skilled and semi-skilled labour, commerce and

minor executive and supervisory positions. The programme would be

flexible, and students would be free to select their own courses.

There were three important characteristics to this decision.

First, government authorities had a laissez-faire attitude about the

policy; they accepted the Canadian position though the latter had a

Application of policy analysis in educational

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d i fferent reason for advocating diversified schooling. Second, though the

policy was a radical change from the existing system, it was a pilot programme

and would be implemented on a very limited basis. As such, it

faced no opposition because it did not pose an immediate threat to any

major interest groups. Finally, the donor community strongly promoted

the policy: CIDA to prepare people for the demands of modern nationhood,

and USAID to ensure the political security of the provincial areas.

Planning policy implementation

Planning for implementation was quite extensive, aided by a CIDA

technical assistance project and a USAID 'companion' project in support

of the diversification policy. Education authorities and project

donor agencies closely managed implementation of the policy, and

made several important modifications as the need arose. Architectural,

procurement, and maintenance procedures were developed to reduce

costs and make them more efficient. Course offerings were consolidated,

and practical subjects were added to the curriculum of the upper

secondary schools in the CIDA project.

Policy impact assessment

The following events in Situation B (Figure 3) in the early 1970s

provided an impetus for evaluation of the policy: The political situation

had changed dramatically - student demonstrations brought down

the military government and the ranks of the insurgency continued to

grow. The economy had slowed substantially, leading to economic problems

in the rural areas, and large income disparities and urban and

educated unemployment. In general secondary education, concerns

continued to be expressed regarding internal and external efficiency.

The piloted programme of diversified schooling was considered

a success in terms of desirability: enrolments were over targ e t

(partly due to an aggressive recruitment drive), the level of academic

work was high and the schools appeared to be influencing students

to choose vocational education at the upper secondary

Education policy-planning process:

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level. Further, there was considerable community support. However,

on counts of feasibility and affordability the picture was not as bright.

The system was unable to train sufficient instructors to teach practical

subjects, or provide an adequate supply of curriculum guides and textbooks.

Also, the schools were expensive to construct and operate.

Second Policy Cycle

Policy response: generating policy options

Though some experts and educators began meeting in 1971 to discuss

possible changes, the coup in 1973 gave impetus to a reform movement.

This led to the creation of a special committee of prominent and highly respected

intellectuals and bureaucrats in 1 974 charged with laying the groundwork

for systematic and system-wide reform. The reform committee commissioned

its own studies, and also drew upon studies completed by UNESCO

(highlighting the wide disparities of economic growth rates between the

rural and urban areas, implicating the low educational level of farmers and

other rural workers) and the World Bank. The Committee viewed reform of

secondary education as driven by the following objectives: (1) to address the

demand for secondary education in the rural areas in order to stem insurgency;

(2) to improve the quality of instruction, and (3) to provide the type

of education that would prepare students for work. The policy options proposed

included: (I) Focusing on traditional secondary education while

improving equity, external eff i c i e n c y, and quality; (II) Continuing to implement

diversified education in a limited way, but maintaining traditional

secondary education as the prominent mode; and (III) Expanding diversified

schooling, making it the prominent mode.

Evaluation of policy options

The policy options were not systematically evaluated. At the outset,

the reform committee felt that meeting the above objectives required

a 'strategic' policy (as described in Chapter I) as compared

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to one that was 'issue-specific' as the 1966 policy was. Therefore, the

committee rejected option I because it did not meet their philosophical

requirements, and option II because it was too narrow in scope.

Option III, then, was the only policy option seriously considered.

The committee found it desirable because it met the above objectives.

In terms of affordability, capital costs would be about 20 per cent

higher than for general secondary schools, but recurrent costs would be

about equal. The committee determined the desirability outweighed

cost but believed it possible to cut costs further, and increase school

fees to help finance the policy. Finally, the committee felt that implementation

problems encountered in the pilot stage could be avoided.

Policy decision

The committee' s recommendation to introduce diversified education

on a nationwide basis was endorsed by the cabinet and became part of the

National Development Plan. One of the most salient characteristics of this

decision was that it built upon the first policy cycle. Through piloting the

reform first, the authorities were able to gauge demand, and were also able

to anticipate and address problems encountered at that time in the new

reform. Though the original policy was largely inspired and promoted by

the international community and derived from comprehensive schools in

other countries, through the implementation process it had become a 'Thai

product'. Finally, this reform was backed by individuals who had the will

and the political wherewithal to see it through.

Planning implementation

Though the decision-making process itself was synoptic (see

Chapter I), the approach to implementation was incremental, executed

in a step-b y-step manner which enabled lessons learned at

one stage to be incorporated in the next. Planning for the reform

was broadly sketched by the National Education Commission and

the reform committee, but the nitty-gritty details including costing,

etc., were specified by the Department of General Education.

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Further elements of planning were carried out within the context of

three World Bank-financed projects. Throughout implementation,

local teachers and community leaders were consulted and involved,

and a concerted effort was made to make the objectives of the reform

clear to students and parents.

Policy impact assessment

The policy was evaluated routinely through government assessments,

World Bank project reviews, and University of Alberta (Canada) studies. In

assessing the results of the policy, the various interest groups (the T h a i

government, the World Bank and the Canadian government) generally

found that most of their expectations for the policy, as determined during

policy evaluation, had been met. To begin with, there continued to be a high

demand for the schools as attested to by over-t a rget enrolments, and opinion

surveys showed that parents found the schools better than, or as good as,

other secondary schools. Second, the schools were moderately successful in

imparting vocational skills to students. However, the schools were not successful

in changing students' career aspirations, and the majority of secondary

graduates still preferred to continue their education at the tertiary level,

instead of terminating their studies and entering the workforce. Finally, the

policy advanced the national objectives of community development and

contributed to maintaining country security.

IV. Burkina Faso: a case of an externally influenced

comprehensive approach

At independence in 1960, the government of Upper Volta was faced

with the need to expand primary education within the constraints of a

severely limited national budget. The government accepted advice to institute

a system of rural nonformal education to provide primary education

to its rural people, while the small urban populations would continue to

have access to traditional primary schools (first policy cycle). In the early

1970s, the government chose to continue these parallel systems with

some qualitative reforms of rural education (second policy cycle). In

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1986, the government shifted away from rural education and made formal

schooling the dominant mode of primary education (third policy

cycle).

First Policy Cycle

The situation leading to policy formulation in 1960

(Situation A)

Burkina Faso, formerly a French colony and known until 1983 as

Upper Volta, became an independent republic in 1960. It was considered

one of the poorest countries of the world due to its: landlocked

location, poor soils, hard climate, water shortages, lack of known

mineral resources, lack of educated and skilled manpower, high infant

death rate, low life expectancy, and low GNP per capita.

Due to its lack of resources, Upper Volta received substantial foreign

aid to finance public investment and balancing the national budget.

This left the country very dependent on donor countries which wielded

a great deal of influence on internal decisionmaking.

The Voltaic education system was based on the French model, providing

six years of primary schooling and seven years of secondary

schooling with a highly academic curriculum. Illiteracy was pervasive.

The government was faced with the following constraints: (I) limited

and inequitable access to education; (2) externally inefficient schools,

because the academic nature of general education was more relevant to

the small modern sector, but the quality did not equip students to cope

with its requirements; and (3) internally inefficient schools with high

rates of repetition and drop-out.

What was the potential for change? Parents' and students' expectations

for change were heightened by the country's anticipated

independence, but country conditions placed limitations. Economic

constraints would limit adopting a costly and extensive reform; the

educational system was small and little developed; and the government

was highly centralized and local institutions had not

Education policy-planning process:

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been developed, so that the onus of any reform would rest on

Ouagadougou.

The generation of policy options

How to provide access to basic education to all children, given the severe

economic constraints of the country, was the mission charged to a team of

two French educators, experienced Africanists, who a priori felt that the

French colonial (academic) pattern of schooling was inappropriate to the

kind of development necessary in most of Africa, which was largely based

on an agricultural economy. They visited the country for 45 days and gathered

what little data existed on the population, the manpower needs, and the

state of the economy. Due to a lack of data, they were forced to make 'best

guesses' and, as they reported, many of their figures were gross estimations.

They concluded that the high illiteracy rates in the rural areas and the lack of

educational services were the major problems facing Voltaic education.

More specifically, their study highlighted the lack of educational services,

the external and internal inefficiencies, and the coastlines of education. To

respond to this situation, the team determined that the only three options

were: (I) expanding the primary system of education so as to provide access

to all; (II) introducing streaming after the third year of primary education;

and (III) introducing an alternative system of education, a shorter programme

of study with a more relevant curriculum.

Evaluation of policy options

A full evaluation of all three options was never conducted. T h e

French experts, driven by a distinct philosophy which favoured

n o n-formal education, dismissed out of hand as undesirable the

option of providing universal access to primary (academic) education

because the curriculum was irrelevant, and costly. The second

option, to introduce streaming after the third year of primary education,

was considered affordable, but was also rejected because it

could encourage elitism, divisiveness and social conflict. The only

alternative that was seriously considered, then, was a

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programme of nonformal rural education which would provide literacy

instruction and training in agricultural skills. This option was never

actually evaluated in terms of its implications on Situation A. Rather, the

decision was reasoned out from linear projections of population growth,

growth of the economy and manpower needs. In comparison to primary

education, rural nonformal education offered several advantages: it was

more desirable (providing a more relevant education that could indirectly

raise rural incomes and living standards); it would be more easily

implemented (drawing upon human and natural resources which already

existed in the rural areas) and it would be less costly (three years in comparison

to six, capital costs would be minimal, and recurrent costs would

be offset by productive activities of the schools). The team did not assess

the reaction of parents but made two assumptions about them: that they

would prefer access to a shortened (three year) education rather than no

education at all, and that they would prefer to be taught by local residents

who better understood them and their customs, rather than by graduates

of the normal schools. Had a proper analysis of the existing situation been

conducted and the appropriate implications been drawn, it would have

been clear that, because formal education was regarded as the key to

moving out of rural poverty, this was a fatal mistake.

Making the policy decision

In essence, the decision to institute a system of rural nonformal education

was made a priori. The experts' report was approved by the

Voltaic Legislative Assembly in late 1959, and rural nonformal education

(a 3-year basic literacy and numeracy programme) was slated to

become the dominant model of education.

The decision was reached through a 'synoptic' approach to policy

making (see Chapter I). The French team had developed what they thought

to be a consistent, comprehensive and 'correct' solution to the problems in

the education sector. This 'imported' policy came attached with funding

from the French government, which greatly influenced the Voltaic government's

decision. The policy was strategic in nature (as characterized in

Chapter I), represented a radical departure from the existing Situation A

Education policy-planning process:

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62

(Figure 3), and was made without regard to the need for proper infrastructure

to support it. All of this portended difficulties for implementation

.

Planning policy implementation

Planning for the reform was done mainly by expatriates. A schedule

was developed to run through 1969, which set targets for the number

of centres, teachers, etc. Careful attention was also given to how

the reform would be financed: savings from downsizing of primary

education, and substantial aid from the French and the European

Economic Community. The designers of the plan felt confident that

rural education would be welcomed by the peasants and so made no

plans to 'market' it.

The radical nature of the reform made it exceedingly difficult to

implement and the institutions created to administer it proved ineffective

in dealing with problems as they arose. This led to a narrowing of

the scope of the reform, and a de facto shift in support activities from

the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Policy impact assessment

In the early 1970s, the government, with the assistance of the World

Bank and UNESCO, evaluated the policy of rural nonformal education.

Assessment revealed the following conditions in Situation B: (1)

rural education had not had much of an influence on the economy,

which had stagnated since independence, and low agricultural productivity

continued to contribute to out-migration from the rural areas; (2)

the performance of non-formal rural education was mixed - the centres

had been able to keep costs down, but were able to reach only about

o n e-fifth of the targeted population, achievement levels were

mediocre, and the centres had gradually turned away from teaching

agricultural skills and had become a poor substitute for primary education;

and (3) primary education continued to suffer from problems of

access, efficiency and cost.

Application of policy analysis in educational

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Second Policy Cycle

New policy cycle: generating policy options

After evaluation of the reform, the government of Upper Volta found

itself in much the same position as it had been at independence, and faced

with two options: (I) to expand the primary education sector to meet the

educational needs of the country, or (II) to continue with the alternative

of rural nonformal education (with some modifications of the policy).

The mixed results concerning the performance of rural nonformal education

and the continued inefficiency and coastlines of primary education

would make it a difficult decision. Parents and students were losing faith

in nonformal education which they evidenced through decreasing enrolments.

The Ministry of Education (MNE), which had administrative

control over the schools, was giving rural education the lowest possible

priority rating. Despite that, the international and bilateral development

agencies continued to encourage rural non-formal education. In many

ways, they analyzed the situation just as the French experts did 10 years

earlier using population and budget projections without taking account of

popular views of the purposes of education.

Evaluation of policy options

The evaluation process greatly resembled the one that took place at

independence. Expanding access to primary education was undesirable

for reasons of external eff i c i e n c y, and unaffordable based on possible

budget growth. Policy option II was not fully evaluated in terms of its

implications but the international donors strongly supported 'staying the

course' with rural nonformal education for philosophical reasons.

F u r t h e r, policy-makers concluded that it would be five times less costly

than primary education, was desirable because it would keep the

youth in the rural areas, and most appealing of all, would be implementable

because it would be supported by the international donor

c o m m u n i t y. Though the Ministry of Education and parents and students

continued to oppose the reform, rural education was entrusted to the

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64

Ministry of Agriculture (MAE), with the encouragement of a number

of donor agencies.

Making the policy decision

Though the MNE was opposed to nonformal education, the decision was

taken at 'the highest level', and based on the financial support proposed. A s

a result, the government passed an education reform bill in 1975 which was

basically a programme policy (discussed in Chapter I), addressing the questions

of how and where rural education should be provided. The primary

objective of the programme was to focus on qualitative reform, not expansion,

of the existing system, and to help graduates of the system establish

themselves on the land and/or in other revenue-earning enterprises. T h e

decision had three major characteristics: it was comprehensive (synoptic) as

it would cover all components of the rural education system, it was conceived

of by sources outside the country who had not fully considered its feas

i b i l i t y, and it was alien to the population of Upper Vo l t a .

Planning policy implementation

Expressing their enthusiasm for the policy, individual donor organizations

began their own planning and implementation schedules for

the reform even before the bill was passed and without any overarching

blueprint for the reform. Furthermore, weaknesses in the comprehensive

'synoptic' approach began to show. Since it required complicated

and delicate mechanisms and networks schedule, it proved to

be beyond the Voltaic administrative capabilities, and changes at one

step reverberated throughout the reform.

Policy impact assessment

In the early 1980s, the donors undertook a major assessment of

the merits of rural nonformal education. Freed from their earlier philosophical

predisposition, they found the outcomes of the policy to

be seriously disappointing for a variety of reasons. First of all,

Application of policy analysis in educational

planning activities: four exemplary cases

65

rural nonformal education proved to be undesirable because: (1) it had

not significantly increased literacy; (2) it had not provided a quality alternative

to the formal system - the rural population continued to reject this

system because the quality was inferior to six years of primary education;

(3) it had not significantly increased access to education in the rural areas;

(4) it had not stemmed the tide of emigration. Further, post-school training

programmes had not been successful in integrating school leavers

into the agricultural sector. Second, it was judged unaffordable - the cost

of a rural education was much higher than originally projected and, in

fact, was greater than for primary education. Finally, rural education had

made no apparent impact on the agricultural sector.

Third Policy Cycle

The new policy cycle

The government again confronted the strategic policy question of how to

expand access to education without an increase in resources for education.

The options were the same as before (I) to continue to depend on rural education

as a means of increasing educational opportunities, or (II) to abandon

rural education in order to expand the formal system.

Analysis of the situation came from several sources. The Ministry of

Education conducted its own research of the population, and held seminars

and conferences to determine what type of reform to pursue. Though both

alternatives were considered undesirable for cost and efficiency reasons,

rural education was the least desirable, as noted above. Finally, Capt.

Thomas Sankara came to power in a populist revolt, and he supported a

more egalitarian form of education than the existing dual system. For these

reasons the government turned its attention back to the formal system to

determine ways in which primary education could be made a viable model

for basic education on a large scale (the synoptic approach).

In order to facilitate the process of evaluating policy option II, a

Computer Simulation Model was used by the major interest groups,

including representatives from the Ministries of A g r i c u l t u r e ,

Education policy-planning process:

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66

Education and Higher Education, and Finance as well as from teachers'

unions and private school owners, to assess the cost implications of

various scenarios. The group went through a painful iterative process

of evaluations, negotiations, modifications, 'trade-offs' and so on.

Finally, they agreed that Burkina Faso could accelerate the expansion

of primary education most cost-effectively by: (1) lowering unit costs

and (2) increasing resources to primary education through reallocating

resources from other areas of education. Not surprisingly, the new policy

met with some opposition, both from the Ministry of Agriculture,

which was unprepared to give up on the rural education centres, and

from the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, which did not

approve of any attempts to cut back allocations to higher education.

Whatever the final decision regarding non-formal rural education, one

thing is certain: it takes some time to reverse a policy which already

has a bureaucracy with a vested interest in seeing it continue.

The above four case studies illustrate, each in a specific way, the

dynamics of policy formulation and planning over time, highlighting

the interplay among actors and the interaction across processes. In the

next section, the results of these studies are synthesized to draw lessons

pertaining to potential success or failure of different policy planning

approaches, and to derive specific implications for education

planners.

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Chapter III. Lessons from the cases

The country case studies in Chapter 1I vividly illustrate the utility of

the two analytical instruments outlined in Chapter I - the model and the

framework - in unravelling the policy-planning process. If we map the

various policy-making cycles of each country on a graph (Figure 4),

we find that most of them fall in quadrant I.

This indicates that much of the decision making was approached

synoptically (i.e. comprehensively), and emanated from an organizational/

bureaucratic source (e.g. the military, the donor community).

Indeed, the organizational/bureaucratic mode (quadrants I and IV) was

the prominent source of decision-making (six of the nine cycles fall

here). Looking more closely, we see that this mode predominated in

the early policy cycles in all four countries. This in part reflects their

stage of development: in all except Peru, it was external parties, in

concert with 'client' government officials, which dominated the process,

because governments were at a relatively early stage of developing

their national capacity. In Peru, the authoritarian military government

was able to impose policy.

It was only further along in the process, as country governments

developed their institutional capacity, that the societal/personalistic

mode held sway (quadrant II). To examine the idea of system-wide

reform in Thailand and Jordan, committees were constituted which

represented a variety of interest groups, including teachers' unions,

various members of education ministries, school and university administrators,

etc. In both case, parents and students were also consulted,

either at the policy formulation or policy implementation stage.

.

68

Figure 4. Mapping of decision making for policy-planning

In Burkina Faso, the international community brought together the

various interest groups to generate and evaluate policy options. It

seems unlikely that much policy making takes place in quadrant III.

This is because incremental policy making is generally limited in its

effects, and therefore does not incite the same level of political interest;

for this reason it does not require the type of interaction and negotiation

characterized by the societal/ personalistic mode.

The organizational/bureaucratic mode intersected with the incremental

approach in policy making in the first policy cycles of Jordan

and Thailand. In both cases, pilot programmes were instituted by

government officials together with international actors, in order to test

the waters for system-wide reform. One of the major questions both

countries needed to answer was whether or not a demand existed for

the reform, and piloting permitted this. Furthermore, before

broad-based reform could be introduced, negotiations among numerous

interest groups had to take place.

Lessons from the cases

69

The rest of this section looks closely at what can be concluded from

applying the conceptual framework described in Chapter I to the diff e r e n t

components of the policy-planning process in the cases of Peru, T h a i l a n d ,

Jordan, and Burkina Faso. Conclusions are drawn along two dimensions:

(I) lessons derived from each case separately, and (2) lessons derived

across cases in terms of each component of the conceptual framework.

Peru

The Peruvian reform clearly demonstrates a case of a highly calculated,

systematic, internally consistent, and comprehensive mode of

policy making. The case pivoted on a 'unitary, rational' revolutionary

actor, the military government, who through a systematic and technical

process of diagnosis, response and action went about finding the

'correct' solutions to educational problems, and radically reforming the

system. Indeed, educational policies were formulated on the basis of a

serious diagnosis of the economic, social and educational situation.

Moreover, they were conceived within a carefully planned programme

of action for reforming the whole national structure. Plans for the education

sector itself were characterized by a high degree of internal logical

deduction and comprehensive coverage.

Where was the fatal flaw? It seems that the apparent strength of the

Peruvian approach to policy making was actually its main weakness.

The initial mistake lay in the manner in which policy options had been

generated by the military planners and their civilian advisors. Perhaps

influenced by the top-down discipline of the military hierarchy, the

government acted as if, once it had identified the best option for Peru,

the citizenry would listen and respond to the new orders. To the extent

that this did not happen, they reasoned, public education would surely

convince people that they should support the new plan with enthusiasm.

Missing was an understanding of the difficulty of rapidly altering

basic cultural values and the profound nexus in the family between

these values and parents' aspirations for their children. While the

egalitarian revolutionary objectives of the new regime were applauded

in principle by Peru's citizens, they clashed sharply with deeply held

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individualist aspirations for securing social mobility. Rather than recognizing

the importance of these values for its citizens and developing policy

options which took them into account, the military regime concentrated on

plans fitting with their deductively generated view of the needs of Peru as

a collectivity. Despite elaborate efforts at consultation and public education,

the Velasco regime could not convince enough Peruvian citizens that they

and their families should, as individuals, actively participate in the government'

s revolutionary reform. This reluctance was particularly baffling to

many of the government's military leaders because they noted broad support,

in principle, for their reform.

The process of making the policy decision was, itself, a mixture of

strengths and weaknesses. The strengths largely derived from the

broad based and lengthy attempts at consultation carried out by the

military regime as well as the clarity of the ultimate decision as articulated

in the 1972 decree-law. The weakness was in the inability of

the military to see, as a result of the undercurrent of dissatisfaction present

from the beginning to the end of its consultations, that the reform

was too revolutionary to be accepted by its citizens, at least in the short

run. In addition, to make matters worse, to the extent that the government

was aware of the improbability of success, it decided on a process

of staged implementation. This allowed citizens and communities

who preferred Peru' s traditional educational system to the regime's

revolutionary reform to exercise their opposition.

Once the decision had been made and plans for implementation

were drawn up, the process mirrored those of generating and evaluating

policy options. Goals were set and committed reformers moved

full steam ahead to make plans to implement them. Reluctantly, they

were slowed down by signs of popular nonsupport and erosion of

foreign support. Foreign help was particularly crucial for the most

experimental aspects of the reform such as the ESEP professional education

schools. Doubts about the feasibility of the reform' s objectives

slowed down the flow of foreign technical and financial support which

initially had hailed the Peruvian experiment as path breaking for its

plans to implement diversified education full-scale. By the time

Lessons from the cases

71

Fernando Belaunde Terry had returned to power in 1980, only a ghostly

skeleton of the 1972 reform had been implemented.

All this points to the vital linkages between the educational system and

the socio-p o l i t i c o-economic structure. Any policy change, therefore, is not

purely technical or unitarily rational. Different interest groups each have

their own legitimate 'rationality' for understanding and responding to an

educational initiative. Rather than perfecting the 'correct' reform to be

implemented by obedient managers, and converting the public to the unitary

rationality, it is certainly more productive, in the long run, to seek to

understand the processes through which trade-offs are accomplished

among the interests underlying the various rationalities relevant to a given

policy choice.

Jordan

The Jordanian case illustrates how the policy-planning process itself

(and the actors involved) can change over time. The process evolved from

a limited incremental approach, essentially directed by the international

c o m m u n i t y, to a comprehensive synoptic approach, with input from all of

the relevant interest groups, domestic and international. These concepts

are elaborated below.

The government took the more conservative incremental approach to

introducing comprehensive education in the 1970s, in large part due to the

murkiness of the prevalent situation. Therefore, it was more sensible to

proceed in a cautious manner. The concept of comprehensive schools was

opted for in a tentative manner and was introduced incrementally, sequentially

and in a limited scope.

Certainly this approach to policy development proved advantageous in

many respects: (a) there was no need for long-term and elaborate planning

at the national level - only at the project level; (b) implementation would

be relatively easy because no national or conceptual reform was involved;

(c) no political mobilization or intense bureaucratic negotiations were

necessary; and (d) no major institutional changes were needed to accommodate

the policy modifications. In addition, little political opposition was

anticipated; because of the limited risks involved, no group felt the need

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to present its case in terms of comparative advantages and disadvantages

of the policies under consideration.

On the negative side, there were disadvantages to the incremental

approach: because it was very 'low risk', the government was not as

inclined to invest much in terms of political capital or other resources

to carry it off successfully. This resulted in poor planning which impeded

implementation. Further, because it was an 'isolated' response to

the imbalance between the needs of the economy and the output of the

education system, apparently affecting only a sub-sector of the system,

implications for the rest of the system were not drawn.

In comparison, the second cycle demonstrates a more highly calculated,

systematic and comprehensive mode of policy making. Its success

depended on three things: First of all, it was reached after an exhaustive

process of review, assessment, and analysis of the education system that

included high level representatives from both the public and private sectors.

Second, even though it was comprehensive and strategic, as in the

earlier cycle it also incorporated a phased implementation plan; experience

in each phase was to be systematically monitored and evaluated

and the results used as feedback for modifications of future phases.

F i n a l l y, the process was driven by a combination of strong political will

at the highest levels, and a sophisticated, technical machinery - t h e

Centre for Research and Development.

Thailand

As in the case of Jordan, the process of introducing diversified education

into Thailand demonstrates an evolving approach to policy making.

In the mid 1960s, the national objectives were rather narrow (concerning

manpower needs), so the government adopted an 'issue-specific' policy.

The approach at this point was incremental and conservative - the government

wished to see how diversified education would be accepted, and viewed

this as a pilot programme. The policy then evolved over time and

took on more of a Thai character, with wider 'strategic' objectives. During

the second policy cycle, when the government was reviewing whether to

carry on with diversified education or to abandon the effort, it

Lessons from the cases

73

had several objectives to meet: manpower needs, national unity and

educational equity. Therefore, the policy had to be 'strategic' in order

to meet this diversity of objectives. Again as in Jordan, implementation

throughout the two policy cycles was incremental.

Why did the authorities succeed better with diversified education in

Thailand than in other countries where it was tried? To begin with, the

Thais did not make it a second class education, open chiefly for academic

failures. They did not trade access to education for quality. T h e

diploma of the diversified schools was fully equal to that of the college

preparatory schools. In addition, diversified education was not a terminal

programme, liable to be seen as a dead-end. There was a great deal

of flexibility in the new curriculum which required students to take practical

courses, but still enabled them to go on to university, if they chose.

Second, because the policy was initially narrow in scope, or incremental,

it did not provoke the type of controversy or violent reaction

that a more comprehensive, synoptic approach might have.

Third, the policy was considered at a national level, that is to say from a

synoptic approach, only after limited pilot projects had proved it to be successful.

The incremental nature of the first cycle gave the Thais an opportunity

to test the acceptance of the policy. The promise of financial support

from the international community which was promoting diversified education

at this time certainly tipped the balance in favour of this policy, and limited

the way in which other options were evaluated. However, the Thai education

authorities did not just accept project loan money but experimented

with pilot programmes, to see if they could build a demand for this type of

education. When they achieved acceptance and demand, they built a consensus

within the government and within the donor community, and eventually

came up with a policy that had a definitive Thai character.

Fourth, the incremental nature of implementation allowed a 'learning

by doing', and the Thais benefited from the opportunity of

making changes based on feedback as the policy progressed.

Though not necessarily inherent to the incremental implementation

approach, the implementation process in Thailand contributed greatly

to the success of the policy. The decision to make diversified education

the predominant mode of secondary schooling was

Education policy-planning process:

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74

made at the central level, by the reform committee; however, during

implementation local providers and consumers of education were

included in the process.

It is surprising to see how much weight was placed on the criterion

of desirability over the criteria of implementability and affordability in

evaluating policy options, especially in the second cycle. Though a few

schools had successfully adopted the diversified curriculum in the

early 1970s, it had been quite expensive to do so and it was not clear

that the policy would be capable of being implemented universally and

at a lesser cost. The government was certainly taking a risk with this

decision, but behind it lay the belief that it was the right one for secondary

education in Thailand. The success of diversified education in

Thailand when it has failed in most other countries, clearly underscores

the crucial role of the policy decision making and implementation

process, but does not necessarily attest to the merit of the educational

model itself.

Burkina Faso

The introduction of rural non-formal education into Upper Volta (first and

second policy cycles) clearly demonstrates a case of a synoptic approach to

policy making with a twist: one driven by external forces. The international

actors were working within a mindset which assumed that (I) there are universal

concepts, or an internationally collected wisdom, which applies to any given

situation, and (2) that this wisdom can be transferred into any country. In essence,

they felt that, once one had a clear idea of the problem, the appropriate solution

could simply be taken off the shelf, so to speak. Afterwards, all that was

necessary would be to provide technical assistance and funding - with little

attention paid to the country's demands and constraints.

On the surface, it appeared that such a system of education

would provide a more relevant form of basic education at a cost that

the new government could afford. This policy had all the elements

of success: intemational respectability, financial backing and a

good chance for implementation because of the support of several

l a rge international organizations. In addition, the synoptic

Lessons from the cases

75

approach employed in the policy-making process provided some

advantages. First, the comprehensive nature of the reform helped create

a critical mass which is necessary to any successful policy implementation.

Second, the reform placed special emphasis on institutional

development. With all these advantages, why did the policy fail?

There were several fatal weaknesses in the policy-making process. T h e

major flaw was that demand factors were totally ignored. The decision

revolved around the experts' detailed examination of the situation. T h o u g h

they briefly entertained ideas concerning alternative policy options, their

biases predisposed them to favouring rural non formal education as the 'correct

and only' solution to the problem. Therefore, they assumed that consumers

of education would embrace it. In the decision-making process, the

government did not draw the proper implications from this option, overlooking

the fact that it might be rejected by parents and students, because

denying them access to the formal educational system would close off the

only door to escape from their difficult subsistence existence.

There is an important lesson here. Interest groups must be dealt

with in the policy process, otherwise they will use everything within

their power to manipulate the policy to meet their own objectives. In

the case of Burkina Faso, parents used the only means at their disposal

to interfere with the reform - passive resistance. Rural teachers

made up another interest group that was ignored in the

d e c i s i o n-making process. These teachers subsequently demanded that

they be treated like primary teachers, accorded the same status and

s a l a r y, which made the reform financially unviable. Neither donors

nor decision-makers in Burkina Faso saw the importance of bringing

interest groups into the original decision-making process. Particularly

after the first policy cycle, when they could see that rural education

was not widely accepted, they identified the 'salesman' as the problem

instead of the 'product': instead of recognizing that rural education

was not being accepted in the countryside, because people did not

want it, the decision-makers identified the Ministry of Education as

the problem. To their way of thinking, the Ministry of Education was

not successful in 'selling' the reform, so they simply switched

Education policy-planning process:

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76

salesmen (to the Ministry of Agriculture) and continued to attempt to

get the consumers of education to 'buy' the reform.

Second, the introduction and reform of rural non formal education

were led by the international donor community; in this respect, the

government was a 'follower' in the policy-making process. Once the

donors entered the policy-making process, the scales were tilted. In

effect, the international community's intervention in the policy process

stifled it. The Voltaic government did not bother to analyze the implications

of the reform, since aid organizations were going to fund it.

The fact that the policy was a creation of external players meant that

the country itself was not necessarily committed to it - Upper Volta had

no feeling of 'owning' this policy.

Third, the introduction of rural non formal education was so far-reaching

that it was beyond the analytical and managerial capabilities of

the Voltaic authorities to design and to implement.

The third cycle demonstrates a departure from the earlier model of

policy making. The government of Burkina Faso came to recognize the

importance of the interaction among different interest groups, the

many dimensions of policy making (the social, political, and financial

aspects), and the importance of both providers and consumers of education.

The process of the analytical evaluation of the different policy

scenarios was greatly aided by a Computer Simulation Model. It is too

early, however, to assess the degree of sustainability of this approach

in generating a policy that is socially and politically desirable, financially

affordable, and nationally implementable and sustainable.

Synthesis across cases

The rest of this section synthesizes what can be learned from the

four cases, summarized in Chapter II, about how policies originate and

how planning results lead to a new cycle of policy analysis and formulation.

The synthesis revolves around the seven elements of the

conceptual framework of policy analysis (Chapter I) as applied across

the cases.

Lessons from the cases

77

Analysis of the existing situation

How are educational problems identified and analyzed, and how does

a policy cycle begin or recommence? In most cases, analysis covered the

education sector, as well as socio-p o l i t i c a l-economic factors. However, in

spite of its importance, there was very little appraisal of the forces for (or

against) change, to assess the feasibility of success of policy reform. None

of the four countries took full account of interest groups in the first policy

cycle. At independence in Burkina Faso, French experts arrived in the

country and conducted their analysis independently of any local interests,

most importantly students and their parents. Similarly in Peru, the military

government conducted its own analysis of the education system purposefully

omitting teachers and administrators as they were viewed to be

obstacles to change. In both instances, the reforms ran into implementation

problems and in the end were unsuccessful due in no small measure

to the failure to create demand among those neglected in the process.

Successful policyplanning should take into account the dynamics for

change and the concems of the various interest groups.

Of importance to this discussion is the nature of the state as an institution

- it can be either conducive to, or resistant to, change. For

example, in Peru, the fact that the military government was highly centralized

meant that it could, at least in theory, more easily introduce

system-wide reform. In contrast, more socially and politically conservative

societies, such as existed in Thailand and Jordan, were compelled

to tread more cautiously when it came to educational reform.

The process of generating policy options

This stage involves two issues: first, how thorough was the analysis

that prompted a policy change and second, how were policy

options formulated? Cases consistently demonstrated that policy

options were not derived from a high quality, knowledgebased,

'home grown' analysis. In the case of the first policy cycle in

Jordan, actual data collection and analysis were skimpy due to the

unstable political situation at the time. Policy-makers here

Education policy-planning process:

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78

depended more on international opinion. Similarly in Thailand, though

data were more readily available, they were viewed through the prism

of international experts. In Peru, a number of reports were commissioned

over a period of three years that were all conceived of and executed

within a revolutionary framework. This certainly biased the analysis

and the eventual process of generating and evaluating possible policies

to address the country's problems. Finally, in Burkina Faso, the

foreign experts admitted that many of their figures were 'best guesses'.

The government's later move to refocus on primary education was

partly a result of a Ministry of Education nationwide survey, conducted

through conferences and seminars, to determine what kind of education

was needed and desired by the country.

As far as formulation of policy options is concerned, the case studies

clearly show that, in practice, there is no systemic mode whereby data is

generated, and then a full range of options is formulated, prioritized, and

refined. A limited number of policy options were usually contrived,

determined by the ideologies of the actors. In Peru, the military government

had devised an overall approach to social reform within whose framework

educational reform had to be fitted, thus significantly narrowing

the range of options. In the first policy cycles in both Burkina Faso and

Peru, policy options other than those promoted by the French in the case

of the former, and the military government in the case of the latter, were

dismissed out of hand. In both countries, these policies met with failure.

There was a wider range of policy options generated in Jordan and

Thailand, and in both countries the reform introduced initially survived

and was expanded in the second cycle.

In the cases analyzed here, the predominant mode was importation,

whereby the policy option or options were introduced by the international

donor community. The stage of development a country has reached is

crucial in this regard. For example, in Jordan and Thailand the leverage

of the international actors diminished as their national capacity evolved.

By the second policy cycle in each country it was government off i c i a l s

who took the lead in policy making. However, in Burkina Faso the international

donor community continued to hold sway. External involvement

such as that introduced by the

 

i m p o rtation mode

can be positive if

Lessons from the cases

79

it is one input to the process, and if the product is allowed to be internalized;

it can serve as a way for international organizations to

'connect' the developing countries to the world system, and to provide

cross-fertilization among countries. If care is not taken, however,

external influence can be a means by which the international community

imposes its fads and fashions upon less developed countries.

The process of evaluating policy options

Further dispelling the myth of the technical or scientific approach to

policy making in which policy-makers attempt to project and evaluate

objectively the consequences of each possible option, in no case were the

consequences of policy options fully drawn and non-prejudicially weighed.

In fact, such narrow evaluation was heavily influenced by the

values and ideologies of the various interest groups involved. For

example, the military government in Peru did not even allow for a full

evaluation of the one policy option under consideration. In the three other

cases presented (the first policy cycles in Burkina Faso, Thailand and

Jordan), international actors predominated in policy option evaluation. In

the end their particular ideologies prevailed, largely because of the funding

attached. The most extreme example of foreign influence over the

evaluation phase is found in Burkina Faso's second policy cycle. W h e n

the Ministry of Education had decided that rural education was neither

desirable nor feasible, the international actor found another client ministry

which embraced it, to lend support to the policy.

When policy options are evaluated in terms of their desirability,

the obvious question that needs to be posed is desirable to whom?

In a number of cases policy-makers found a particular option desirable

while the consumers of education (students and parents) did

not. Where demand did not exist for a particular policy or was not

generated through the inclusion of the consumers in the process, the

policy was doomed to failure. Such was the case when rural non

formal education was introduced in Burkina Faso, and when diversified

secondary schooling was introduced in Peru, as part of syst

e m-wide reform. In the case of Peru, though the government

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

80

did allow two years of public and professional informal discussions of

the reform, suggestions made during this time were not integrated into

the policy design. Rather, ad hoc responses were devised with the purpose

of avoiding rejection or opposition. It is in the later policy cycles

that governments recognized and sought to address the multiplicity of

interests involved in policy making.

Adoption of the policy decision

Analysis of the policy choice itself brings up issues related to the degree

of radicality and clarity of the decision as well as its implementability. T h e s e

studies have shown that incremental policy making in the initial policy cycle

is more successful than radical change. Piloting of projects in Thailand and

Jordan enabled policy-makers to refine policies through implementation that

fed into the subsequent policy cycles. In both cases where the synoptic

approach was taken, the first cycles of Peru and Burkina Faso, the policies

later ended in failure. There is decidedly a relationship between the governmental

structure and the approach it chooses in policy making. A u t h o r i t a t i v e

governments are more inclined to follow a synoptic approach in policy

making, whereas governments whose political power is more disparate are

more likely to opt for the incremental approach.

The extent to which the policy is articulated clearly contributes to its

success, although governments sometimes intentionally opt for ambiguity

to secure political acceptance for policies more easily. Peru's decision to

introduce secondary comprehensive education was overly theoretical -

how goals could realistically be achieved was overlooked, posing problems

for implementation. In contrast, the incremental approach pursued

by Jordan and Thailand made for a better articulated and therefore more

easily implementable policy. Undoubtedly, policies which are conservative

and incremental, and especially those launched as pilot projects, have

the most chance for success.

F i n a l l y, the question of whether the policy seems operational or

implausible to implement is certainly in the eye of the beholder.

O b j e c t i v e l y, where the reform is comprehensive and synoptic, and the

absorptive capacity of the country is meager, or where there is

Lessons from the cases

81

no demonstrated demand for the policy, the less the likelihood of its success.

This was made quite clear in Upper Volta. In this case, the introduction

of rural non formal education was so far-reaching that it was beyond

the analytical and managerial capabilities of the newly independent

government to design and to implement. However, as indicated above,

some policy-makers felt that through careful planning, as in Peru, or simply

because they believed the policy to be the correct one, as in Upper

Volta, they could make a particular policy work.

Policy planning and implementation

The true test of a policy comes during planning and implementation.

Two major issues related to planning policy implementation have presented

themselves as critical. The first involves the degree to which political

support has been mobilized for the reform, and the second is the

complementarity of micro- and macro-planning. In Thailand, even in the

first cycle, policy planners saw the need to involve administrative staff

in the process, and developed a project centre that would allow supervisors

the opportunity to pursue research and plan for the development of

the schools, and to assist in the improvement of teaching in the project

schools. In the second policy cycle, the reform committee comprised

representatives from a broad range of interest groups, including teachers'

unions, private schools, universities and the National Economic and

Social Development Board. So, from an early time, those who would be

a ffected by the reform were brought in to help decide what form it

would take. In addition, planning was to be a continuous process, leaving

room for modifications to take place as feedback from the field

came in. At the planning and implementation stages, local teachers were

consulted over curriculum redesign and assessment; business leaders

provided technical and administrative support, and community leaders

helped to disseminate information to the local public on area vocational

centres and their functions. Finally, throughout implementation, a

concerted effort was made to make the objectives of the reform clear to

students and parents. In particular, schools would offer 'training and

awareness' programmes, presenting workshop simulations and the

Education policy-planning process: an applied framework

82

like, which would give people in towns and villages the opportunity to

observe the schools in action. In addition, an important aspect of the

reform was the introduction of a strong guidance component to help

the 'consumers' make best use of the 'product'. After students were tested

and streamed in the vocational or academic track, guidance counsellors

were there to explain the results to the students and their

parents, and to help the students choose the best course of study. In the

case of Jordan, no marketing was done in the first stage, the country

profited from this mistake, and in the second policy cycle, a considerable

effort was made to involve all - a free exchange of ideas concerning

the system was afforded for education authorities, parents and

teachers and members of the reform commission (via workshops and

seminars), and the Crown Prince himself met with local and regional

administrators for this purpose.

H o w e v e r, mobilizing political support does not guarantee acceptance

of the reform - in Peru, before a decision had actually been made regarding

educational reform, members of the Reform Commission selected a

group of young men and women to sensitize and mobilize the public to

support the general national reform. When the education reform was being

mapped out, planners clarified the objectives, benefits and roles for teachers,

administrators, and community members. Incentives were designed

to motivate teachers to gain additional training and to participate in the

more innovative aspects of the reform, and community members were

canvassed about the new opportunities and responsibilities embodied in

the reform. This was largely done in a top-down manner, which meant that

there was very little opportunity for input from the general population; this

reform, as noted above, subsequently failed.

The second issue regarding complementarity of macro (national)

planning with micro (project) planning proved to be a problem

for a number of countries. Allowing major planning to take place

at the project (micro) level encourages local participation, but it

does not deal adequately with national (macro) problems. Wi t h o u t

detailed plans at the national level, the Jordanian education system

found itself short of vocational education teachers. In Burkina

Faso's second policy cycle, inadequate overall development

Lessons from the cases

83

planning on the part of the government resulted in disjointed implementation

.

It is during implementation that the formulation of a policy is put to

the test. As noted in Chapter I, modification of policy inevitably occurs

during the implementation phase. This is due to a number of factors,

including the fact that the attempt to implement encounters unanticipated

constraints; political, social, or economic circumstances change;

or feedback causes a reassessment of the original policy decision. The

case studies show that implementation carried out on a 'learning by

doing' step-by-step basis which permits modification, has a better

chance of success than a massive, unitary approach. In Peru, policy

implementation was not planned so that policy improvement could

take place; the reform was intended to be implemented in a single

effort, and this approach to planning diminished the flexibility and

learning possibilities in the implementation stages. In addition, a declining

political situation, as well as a declining domestic and international

economy and extreme financial problems affected support for and

consequently implementation of the reform in the country. In the end,

the government decided to scratch the idea of system-wide reform in

favour of setting up a limited number of experimental schools.

The cost of building comprehensive schools in Thailand during the first

cycle was found to be much greater than anticipated, which threatened to

derail the reform. For this reason, building plans were changed; later, during

the second cycle, a much less expensive prototype design was developed as

well as an alternative and cheaper means of providing practical instruction.

In Jordan, implementation of comprehensive education met a

snag when the need for vocational teachers was greater than the

s u p p l y, as pointed out above. This illustrates the downside of the

incremental approach to policy making - governments do not feel

as committed because they don't have as much invested in the decision.

Therefore, there is a tendency to give the policy inadequate

resources. To remedy this situation, the government had to adopt a

number of incentive measures to attract and retain qualified vocational/

technical teachers. Further, as part of its pilot effort the

government introduced another form of comprehensive schooling,

Educan'on policy-planning process:

an applied framework

84

the general vocational secondary school, as a way to serve thinly populated

areas. As discovered during the policy impact assessment stage (see below),

this experiment was not successful because it suffered from the same problems

as other comprehensive schools - these schools did not fit the demand by students

for a solid general education for all. In the subsequent policy cycle the

demand factor was taken very seriously, which contributed to its success.

Finally, what looks good on paper does not necessarily work in the

real world. Such was the case with Peru, as elaborated above. In

Burkina Faso, though non-formal rural education appeared to be

'objectively' the best solution to the country's dilemma, the radical

reform introduced was simply beyond the analytical and managerial

capabilities of the country to implement. Though the international aid

community strongly believed in and promoted this policy, they could

not cover every aspect of implementation. In the subsequent policy

cycle the same problem was multiplied by the expansion of the reform,

the lack of coordination among the even larger number of international

agencies involved in its implementation, and the fact that the government

itself had not fully developed a reform plan.

Policy impact assessment and subsequent policy cycle

Assessing the impact of a policy is obviously important in order to

determine whether to maintain, modify, or reject it. In general, policy

assessments were not carried out as a 'matter of course' in the policy-

making process. Often no official assessment was made at all, and

the policy was allowed to linger, while new policies are introduced

alongside. Where an assessment was made, however, three issues needed

to be analyzed: what prompted the assessment; how was it conducted

and by whom; and how were the results interpreted- were deficiencies

attributed to implementation or policy?

Most assessments that were conducted in the cases studied were

precipitated by events external to the education sector. One of the

strongest examples is the case of Jordan, where educational reform

became a source of concern in the mid-1980s, only after the

Lessons from the cases

85

country began to experience a serious economic slowdown and a growing

unemployment problem. Though the idea for a similar reform

had been broached in the late 1970s, it was economic difficulty that

forced a reassessment of the situation and created a more receptive

environment for the idea. In Peru, Burkina Faso, and Thailand, political

events brought about policy assessments. In Thailand and the

second policy cycle in Burkina Faso, populist demand for democracy

brought about the toppling of the governments, ushering in new administrations.

They were forced to assess the existing education system

largely on equity grounds and to respond to popular demand for change.

In Peru, though no formal evaluation was made, the political situation

(after a forced election) led to the decision to allow the policy of

diversified education to languish. One danger with this external

prompting is that assessment is conducted prematurely and before a

policy has had time to take roots and produce results.

H o w, when, and by whom the assessment is conducted clearly prejudices

the findings and the subsequent policy cycle. Political factors

influence who will perform the assessment as well. For example, an

assessment performed at the end of Burkina Faso's first policy cycle was

carried out by the international community, which was predisposed to

continue rural, non-formal education. This biased their results and contributed

to the policy's longevity. Though the Ministry of Education had carried

out its own evaluation and had determined that the policy was neither

desired by students and their parents, nor affordable, it was international

aid that held sway with government decision-makers. When the

international ideology began to change, reasserting the importance of universal

primary education, the international community ' s assessment of

rural non formal education in Burkina Faso changed accordingly. Policy

assessment in Jordan was conducted by the National Commission to

Assess Educational Policies, constituted by the Crown Prince, as part of

the educational reform process. In this case, the Crown Prince had already

determined that policy change was in order, before an assessment of

existing policy even took place. In Thailand, though the policy of diversified

education had been introduced largely because it was promoted by

the international community, the government retrieved control of the

Education policy-planning process: an applied framework

86

policy and adapted it to Thai needs. Its assessment, and the subsequent

policy cycle reflected more closely the demand issues in Thai education.

Interpretation of the results of the assessment has a very strong

influence on what comes next. There are three possibilities: first, that

the policy is right on course and should be maintained; second, that the

policy outcome is lacking due to problems of implementation and therefore

should be modified; and third, that the policy outcome is poor

due to the nature of the policy itself, and therefore it should be rejected.

When the outcome was not what was expected, often

policy-makers did not get to the heart of the matter, mistaking implementation

problems for inadequacies of the policy itself, which led to

a decision to abandon it. As an example, in Peru, the military government

was ousted eight years after comprehensive education was initiated;

the new President interpreted this as a rejection of the policy, even

though the first students had not yet graduated from the ESEPs. Due to

the comprehensive nature of the intended reform, this does not appear

to have been an appropriate time for making such a decision. Of the

four case studies, only in Burkina Faso was a decision made to modify

the implementation of an existing policy, during the second cycle;

even in this case, there was a difference in the interpretation of the

assessment. The Ministry of Education had concluded that the policy

was defective and called for abandoning it, but because the international

donor community believed that only implementation was at fault,

they continued to back rural non-formal education.

Lessons from the cases

87

Chapter IV. Conclusion - summary implications

for planners

The conceptual framework for policy analysis and its application to the

four exemplary cases vividly indicate that education planning cannot

be purely technical or linear. It deals with an educational enterprise

that is not characterized by unambiguous issues, clearly defined objectives,

undisputed causal relationships, predictable rationalities and

rational decision-makers. Education policy planning, as such, is by

necessity a series of untidy and overlapping episodes in which a variety

of people and organizations with diversified perspectives are actively

involved in the processes through which issues are analyzed and

policies are generated, implemented, assessed and adjusted or redesigned.

Education planners thus need a methodological approach, similar

to the one presented in Chapter 1, to capture the intricacies of both

policies and processes, to give deliberate attention to every element of

the policy-planning process, and to gauge the evolving dynamics of the

system (flow, procedure, form, and interaction among interest groups).

The above analyses have also made clear that the policyplanning

processes are country-specific (even time bound) and are highly

dependent on sectoral, economic and socio-political conditions and

interactions. Certain recurring factors could, however, be discerned

that have strong implications for effective education planning.

First, education policy development should be based on solid

knowledge along three dimensions: (a) a diagnosis of the sector

itself drawing on data, research, experience and international

knowledge; (b) contextual analysis of the economic, political,

88

demographic, social and cultural conditions and prospects; and (c) an

assessment of the interest groups, their rationalities and roles in education

change, and the processes through which trade-o ffs are accomplished

among them. This contextual analysis, may be influenced by external

sources, but to be effective should be internalized and locally owned.

Second, before a policy decision is made, different viable policy

options need to be generated. This is the easy part. What is more difficult

is to construct scenarios around each option to determine requirements

and consequences. Each scenario should be systematically analyzed

and evaluated, not only in terms of the educational merit of the

policy proposal but also in terms of its desirability (taking into consideration

the multiplicity of interests involved), financial affordability,

feasibility in terms of the implementation capacity of the country, and

sustainability over a sufficient period of time to show results. The

selection of the optimal option will continue to be ultimately political,

but a rigorous analysis of different scenarios, based on reasonably

good knowledge, enlightens the political decision-making process and

allows the different interest groups to be engaged in consultations in a

meaningful manner.

Third, how radical and comprehensive should a policy choice be? It

is not obvious that an incremental issue-specific approach is always

superior to a comprehensive strategic approach. Certainly, a comprehensive

strategic reform is unlikely to succeed where the absorptive

capacity of the country is meager or where there is no demonstrated

demand for the policy. A step-by-step approach allows experimentation

and adjustment and does not have high political and institutional

demands. On the other hand, this approach may lead to 'low risk'

quick-fixes, and inadequate investment in terms of political capital and

other resources to carry the reform off successfully. The success stories

of the case studies have shown that to solve sector-wide problems in

the context of political and economic demands, it is prudent to start

with a limited incremental phase, but this should be succeeded in time

by a comprehensive strategic approach. The timing and speed of this

evolution should be gauged to the degree of acceptability of the

Conclusion - summary implications

for planners

89

reform by the stakeholders, and the implementation capacity of the

system.

Fourth, whether a policy reform is incremental or comprehensive,

its true test comes during planning and implementation. Here, three

factors proved to be crucial: (a) Macro planning, to address national

problems and provide an overarching blueprint, must be complemented

(and not substituted) by micro planning at the project and local

level; (b) Mobilization of political and public support should be deliberately

planned for and sought and, during the planning and implementation

stage, stakeholders should be actively involved; (c)

Planning should be flexible, leaving room for modifications during

implementation.

Fifth, when a policy goes into effect, it is not the end of the policy-

planning process; it is the beginning of a new chapter. Policy

reforms should be systematically assessed, preferably with a built-in

mechanism, in terms of their impact; is it achieving what was expected

of it at the time of its adoption? While implementation mechanisms

need to be reviewed continuously, policies themselves should be allowed

to mature before a judgement is passed on their impact. Even then,

implementation problems should not be mistaken for inadequacies of

the policy itself. Even if impact assessment concludes that the desired

changes have been successfully implemented, policy-makers and planners

should maintain vigilance for new changes required, given the

rapid pace of contemporary society and the intimate links between an

educational system and its environment. Finally, if a policy is determined

to be ineffective, it should not be allowed to linger while new

policies are introduced alongside. Instead, a new cycle of rigorous

policy design, formulation and planning must be initiated.

In conclusion, educational development is extraordinarily complicated

because it involves and affects a large number of beneficiaries

and providers, as well as political figures, all of whom have a stake in

the process and the outcome. Added to this is the long gestation period

for any policy to realize its objectives. For these reasons, policy change

should not be introduced lightly, nor should it be abandoned without

careful examination.

Education policy-planning process:

an applied framework

90

Selected references and further reading

Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of decision. Boston: Little, Brown and

Company.

Archer, M. 1979. Social origins of educational systems. Beverley Hills

(Calif): Sage.

Archer, M. (ed). 1982. The sociology of educational expansion:

take-off, growth, and inflation in educational systems. Beverley Hills

(Calif): Sage.

Blaug, M. 1987. The economics of education and the education of an

economist. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Caillods, F. 1991. Educational planning for the year 2000. IIEP

Contributions No. 4. Paris: UNESCO/International Institute for

Educational Planning.

Carley, M. 1980. Rational techniques in policy analysis. London:

Heinemann Educational Books.

Coombs, P.; Hallak, J. 1987. Cost analysis in education: a tool for policy

and planning. Baltimore, Maryland: World Bank and Johns Hopkins

University Press.

91

Crouch, L.A.; Spratt J.E., and Cubeddu L.M. 1992. Examining social

and economic impacts of educational investment and participation in

developing countries: the Educational Impacts Model (EIM) approach.

Cambridge: BRIDGES project.

Friedman, L.S. 1984. Microeconomic policy analysis. New York:

McGraw Hill.

Haddad, W.D. et al 1990. Education and development: evidence for

new priorities. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Haddad, W.D.; Demsky T. 1994. The dynamics of education policy

making. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Hage, J.; Finsterbusch K. 1985. Organizational change: a strategy for

Institution Building. Unpublished manuscript, Center for Innovation,

University of Maryland.

Hage, J.; Gargan E. and Hannemen R. 1986. The responsive state vs.

the active state. Unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland.

Hallak, J. 1991. Educational planning: reflecting on the past and its

prospects for the future. IEP Contributions No. 2. Paris:

UNESCO/International Institute for Educational Planning.

Kemmerer, F. 1990. "Going to scale: why successful instructional

development projects fail to be adopted", in D. Chapman and C.

Carrier (Eds.), Improving educational quality: a global perspective.

Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 243-256.

Kemmerer, F. 1994. Utilizing education and human resource sector

analyses. Fundamentals of Educational Planning series, No.47, Paris,

UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning.

References

92

Klees, S.J. 1986. "Planning and policy analysis in education: what can

economists tell us?" Comparative education review (November), pp.

574-607.

Lindblom, C.; Cohen D. K. 1979. Usable knowledge: social science

and social problem solving. New Haven: Yale University.

Mingat, A.; Jee-Peng Tan. 1988. Analytical tools for sector work in

education. Baltimore, Maryland: World Bank and Johns Hopkins

University Press.

Nicholls, A. 1983. Managing educational innovations. London:

George Allen and Unwin.

North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance.

Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

North, D.C. 1994. "The new institutional economics and development",

Forum 1 (2) May, 1994: 3-6.

Psacharopoulos, G. (editor). 1987. ECconomics of education: research

and studies. New York: Pergamon Press.

Ross, K.N.; Mahlck L. (editors). 1990. Planning the quality of education:

the collection and use of Data in informed decisionmaking. Paris:

UNESCO/International Institute for Educational Planning, Oxford:

Pergamon Press.

Stockey, E.; Zeckhauser R. 1978. A primer for policy analysis. New

York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Tsang, M.C. 1993. Methodologies of cost analysis for educational

inclusion of marginalized populations. Paris: UNESCO/ International

Institute for Educational Planning.

References

Verspoor, A.M. 1989. Pathways to change: improving the quality of

education in developing countries. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Wi l e n s k y, H. et al. 1985. Comparative social policy. Berkeley:

University of California Press.

Windham, D. 1988a. "Effectiveness indicators in the economic analysis

of educational activities", International Journal of educational

research, 12(6): 575-666.

Windham, D. 1988b. Indicators of educational effectiveness and efficiency.

Tallahassee, Florida: IEES project.

Windham, D.M. and D.W. Chapman. 1990. The evaluation of educational

efficiency: constraints, issues, and policies. Greenwood, Ct.: JAI

Press, Inc.

References

94

IIEP publications and documents

More than 750 titles on all aspects of educational planning have been

published by the International Institute for Educational Planning. A

comprehensive catalogue, giving details of their availability, includes

research reports, case studies, seminar documents, training materials,

occasional papers and reference books in the following subject categories:

Economics of education, costs and financing.

Manpower and employment.

Demographic studies.

The location of schools (school map) and sub-national planning.

Administration and management.

Curriculum development and evaluation.

Educational technology.

Primary, secondary and higher education.

Vocational and technical education.

Non-formal, out-of-school, adult and rural education.

Copies of the catalogue may be obtained from the IIEP Publications Unit on

request.

95

The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is an international

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دانشجوی دوره دکتری برنامه درسی ورودی 1391 دانشگاه خوارزمی هستم. مدرک ماستری در تعلیم و تربیه را از اولین دوره ماستری پداگوژی در پوهنتون تعلیم و تربیه کابل در سال 1388 گرفتم و استاد پوهنتون(دانشگاه) بامیان از سال 1383 الی 1389 بودم و از سال 1390 الی میزان 1391 با دانشگاه کاتب همکاری داشتم. قصدم از ایجاد این وبلاگ جمع آوری موضوعات پداگوژیکی است که از سایتهای دیگر دریافت و در این وبلاگ منسجم گردد. هنوز به خود اجازه نوشتن در زمینه پداگوژی را نداده ام. آرزویم شادبودن انسانهاست و موفقیتشان.
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اللّهُمَّ كُنْ لِوَلِيِّكَ الْحُجَّةِ بْنِ الْحَسَنِ صَلَواتُكَ عَلَيْهِ وَعَلى آبائِهِ في هذِهِ السّاعَةِ وَفي كُلِّ ساعَةٍ وَلِيّاً وَحافِظاً وَقائِدا ‏وَناصِراً وَدَليلاً وَعَيْناً حَتّى تُسْكِنَهُ أَرْضَك َطَوْعاً وَتُمَتِّعَهُ فيها طَويلاً

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